Who wants to destroy the world?

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“I hope the Russians love their children too” –Sting

 

Spoiler: Yes, Russians love their children too.

NU (Negative Utilitarianism) has been treated in an extremely unfair way compared to CU (Classical Utilitarianism) in the subject of  “The button that destroys everything”. In summary:

• NU is not dangerous if it were true.
• In any case, the “dangerous” aspect of NU is the same in the case of CU, and yet CU is hardly criticized for this reason.
• And, in any case, probably nobody wants to destroy the world, nor will they.

Let’s see it in detail, but before arguing why the NU is treated unfairly: What is the debate? What is the NU criticized for? In NU, a lot of importance is placed on negative experiences, and little or even none on positive experiences. In NU, the bad things in life are considered to have a lot of (negative) value, while the good things in life have very little or even no value. Given that the world has many good things, but also obscene amounts of bad things, this seems to indicate that, for the NU, the world is not worth it; It would be better if it hadn’t existed, and if they could, they would destroy it.

If we assume that destroying the world is inherently bad, then promoting NU or even talking about it could be counterproductive. A very simple answer that a NU could give would be simply that destroying the world (instantly, painlessly) is not inherently bad; or that destroying the world (instantly, painlessly) is not a desirable thing, but is nevertheless a solution to something much worse, a solution to the problem of the world continuing to exist with obscene amounts of suffering. In other words, if the NU framework were correct, seeking solutions under that framework should not be considered a bad idea.

Now, the matter is not so simple. If we take these considerations to the practical ground, we will find the following:

• It is not the same to wish that the world would not have existed than to wish to destroy it, in the same way that it is not the same to wish not to have been born than to wish to commit suicide.
• Quite possibly the NU and CU models are ideal abstractions and do not represent the complexity of personal positions.
• Very possibly, most, if not all those who defend consequentialism, have also strong deontological moral rules, such as not killing, not torturing, not causing great harm, not destroying the world, etc. which they apply, even if they believe that these actions can lead to a greater good.
• It is not the same to have an idea of what is better and worse than to behave that way. Someone may be a negative utilitarian in the sense of what they thinks is better or worse, but not behave like a negative utilitarian on a daily basis, in direct and close actions because, for example, his emotions and instincts do not allow it.
• For example, all else being equal, both NU and CU theoretically should agree to torture a person if with this action they can save 10 from torture. Or they should agree to remove the organs of a healthy person to cure 10 patients, either to avoid further suffering (NU), or to obtain greater global happiness (NU and CU). But simply, I don’t know anyone nor believe that there’s someone really defending this, as illustrated by the trolley dilemma in its “push the fat man from the bridge” mode. Consequentialism is applied, in practice, in cases where there is no conflict with the most primitive deontological intuitions and emotions (like a primitive empathy, close in space, close in time). For example, there is much less conflict to touch the lever in the trolley dilemma. A good real example of the goodness of applied consequentialism seems to me the distribution of budgets that a government makes, for example, between health and defense. The fact that there is some budget invested in something other than health will cause suffering and death, for example, due to lack of ambulances or emergency services. But also the fact that there is a budget invested in anything other than defense can cause suffering and death of citizens, in case of conflict with another country. We can manage these decisions on suffering, life and death, because they are impersonal, more closer to touching the lever. But we would hardly be able to cut off the vital supply, with our bare hands, to someone who desperately needs it to survive.

Where can you see that NU has been treated extremely unfairly compared to CU?

• First of all, it should be clarified that the dilemma, at least potentially, is not just between NU and CU, but also between those who consider the net balance of sentient life to be negative (like me) and those who consider the net balance of sentient life to be positive. Typically, a NU considers that life has a negative net balance, but also a CU may consider that there is more suffering than enjoyment and therefore that the net balance is negative. Of course, for a NU, at least for a strict NU, since NU considers that the value of positive experiences is zero, the net balance of sentient life will always be negative or at most zero, and it can never be positive. But a strict CU that also believes that the net balance of sentient life is negative would also advocate for the button of the destruction of everything.
• Both the strict CU and strict NU should be, at least theoretically, in favour of destroying the world if such an operation and its result implied a better world. For example, a CU would destroy the world if it could do so in a way that implied replacing the world with another world in which there is more happiness; and a NU would destroy it without the need for this to imply a new world. But these positions are abstract conclusions of ideal systems that in practice do not exist, among other reasons, because of the strong deontological considerations.
• In my personal case, being a NU-ish (specifically, a kind of xNU+), I have created my own list of reasons why it is not a good idea to destroy the world, which I quote below.
• In any case, researchers like David Pearce and Simon Knutsson have argued very similarly. We the NU do not want to destroy the world! Although we don’t like how is today! But, sadly, NU has been treated in an extremely unfair way compared to CU.

In David Pearce’s words:

“…the (potentially) apocalyptic implications of classical utilitarianism haven’t received much academic attention. Hence the lack to my knowledge of a scholarly rebuttal. By contrast, the seemingly apocalyptic implications of negative utilitarianism were noted almost as soon as its formulation – and are normally treated as its reductio ad absurdum.” Source. See also.

In Simon Knutsson‘s words:

“The most common argument against negative utilitarianism is the world destruction argument, according to which negative utilitarianism implies that if someone could kill everyone or destroy the world, it would be her duty to do so. Those making the argument often endorse some other form of consequentialism, usually traditional utilitarianism. It has been assumed that negative utilitarianism is less plausible than such other theories partly because of the world destruction argument. So, it is thought, someone who finds theories in the spirit of utilitarianism attractive should not go for negative utilitarianism, but should instead pick traditional utilitarianism or some other similar theory such as prioritarianism. I argue that this is a mistake. The world destruction argument is not a reason to reject negative utilitarianism in favour of these other forms of consequentialism, because there are similar arguments against such theories that are at least as persuasive as the world destruction argument is against negative utilitarianism”. The World Destruction Argument (2019)

And now my arguments. I do not advocate the idea of the “button of the destruction of the universe”. Why?

(Also, a commonly suggested idea is its irreversibility, although it doesn’t seem like a attractive argument to me.)

These ideas are adapted from my article: “The big lie”

1. 1. There is a first group of motives that I consider to be intuitive, related to the respect for individual freedom, or to seek the convergence of different value systems, as well as the indecision to do something that may be totally contrary to our most basic impulses (for example, our most basic impulses of survival or empathy).
   2. Another second group of motives would be practical, such as avoiding social alarm, and generally avoiding a greater evil -such a mistake that leads to disaster-, or that is, simply, technically or politically difficult, if not impossible.
   3. There is a third group of motives, perhaps unintuitive but logical, based on the consequences of our actions.
      • On the one hand and on a “short-term” basis, humanity is demonstrating its ability to end all suffering as it is demonstrating its ability to end all forms of life, for example with nuclear war. But to do so, humanity must exist. In particular, the voluntary human extinction movement would be one of the worst possible ideas in this sense, as it would leave the rest of sentient animal species in a world full of suffering. That is, if someone wanted to destroy “the world” it would not be enough to end the human species, they would have to end all animal species; all sentient beings.
      • On the other hand, and in the “long term”, the disappearance of all sentient life would only delay the problem, since foreseeably evolution would open up again, creating new sentient beings in an endless cycle. In other words, if someone wanted to end “the world”, they would have to make all matter disappear, or at least prevent evolution from acting on it. This is, in my opinion, the definitive argument against the “button of the destruction of the universe”, and is the reason why it is important that humanity continues to exist in general, and effective altruists in particular: someone has to take care to ensure to avoid future suffering, somehow building an earthly paradise, like the one described in David Pearce‘s “The Hedonistic Imperative” project.

 

Are NU and CU discourses dangerous?

Negative Utilitarianism (NU) and Classical Utilitarianism (CU) are two different ways of understanding how to do the most good possible within the framework of Consequentialism. But if they are misinterpreted, they can create disasters. This is not unusual. Tools and knowledge, in general, can be used correctly or incorrectly, and for both good and bad. In philosophy, since fundamental aspects are dealt with, it is common that wrong or misused ideas can lead to terrible mistakes. However, which of the two is the greatest threat in the case of being misinterpreted?

I have the intuition that the probability of causing an apocalyptic situation is more likely by misinterpreting NU than by misinterpreting CU. This will be the hypothesis. But I am not clear why. The following are my reflections to try to clarify my ideas.

1. A Naive Negative Utilitarian (NNU) could try to create a coronavirus that spreads irremediably through all individuals, so that once it has infected the entire population, it annihilates them; while a Naive Classic Utilitarian (NCU) could try to create something similar that annihilates only those who are unhappy, poor, weak or sick, or simply, those who are not happy enough, to make room for happier ones. Technically the first option seems much simpler and therefore more likely. This works in favour of the hypothesis.
2. However, for the NNU it would be relevant that its genetic nuke could perform its work without pain (which would complicate it a lot), while for the NCU this would not be so important. This plays against the hypothesis.
3. Maybe there are more NU than CU? No, certainly. This plays against the hypothesis.
4. Perhaps there are proportionally more NNU than NCU? I don’t know. It’s possible. Maybe the NUs are less intelligent, with less perspective than the CUs and that is why there are more NNU in NU than NCU in CU? I don’t think so. I don’t think this point plays for or against the hypothesis.
5. Does the typical NU guy tend to be more depressive than the typical CU guy? Can the impulse towards total destruction be fed in the form of a projection of their desire not to continue living individually? Maybe. Sounds likely. This works in favour of the hypothesis.
6. Misanthropes are strange bedfellows of the NUs, as they can share similar arguments, while racists are strange bedfellows of the CUs for the same reason. The risk that we may face may not be so much the NNU-NCU, but rather that misanthropes and racists may rely on NU-CU discourses to support their misdeeds. The number of misanthropes is relevant, but the number of racists much more. The number of humans who would like to annihilate all of humankind is and has certainly been much lower than the number of humans who would like to annihilate only Tutsis, Blacks, Hispanics, Jews or Arabs, for which we have very significant historical cases. This plays against the hypothesis.

What importance we shall give to each point? For me, points 5 and 6 are significant when assessing whether the NU speech is more dangerous than the CU speech, followed by points 1, 2, 3 and 4. In particular, I think that the importance of point 5 is very great, which added to point 1, incline me in favour of the hypothesis, despite point 6 and point 2, although their counterweight is also significant. In summary, I would say I give 60% of probability to the hypothesis. Anyway, it seems to me that this matter has many ramifications and nuances that I am ignoring. I think it would be interesting to explore all of them.

 

Related

• NU / SFE vs CU debates in EA
• Problems in effective altruism and existential risk and what to do about them
• Facebook thread about NU is an info hazard