On theories of sentience: a talk with Magnus Vinding

Magnus Vinding

Spanish version

Manu Herrán: Let’s start with the very beginning. I’ll use the word “sentience” for experiences of suffering and enjoyment, and “consciousness” for subjective experiences in general. Not only pain and pleasure but, for instance, to perceive. Does it match your terminology?

Magnus Vinding: Yes.

Manu Herrán: Some researchers consider that in general non human animals have a lack of consciousness. Does it implies that they deserve less (or even none) moral consideration?

Magnus Vinding: “Consciousness” is sometimes understood as “self-knowledge”, which one may seek to operationalize and measure in various ways, yet one obvious way is to ask whether an individual is able to pass the mirror test. Many non-human animals are evidently conscious in this sense. But beyond that, it’s certainly possible for, let’s say, an invertebrate or a developing human child to feel pain without a very clear idea of what’s happening, without having any self-model. But that doesn’t diminish the moral relevance of the suffering itself, if it exists. Sentience, I submit, is ultimately what matters, or at any rate what matters most.

Manu Herrán: Sentience is the only thing that matters?

Continue reading this interview at Sentience Research

 

Posted by Manu Herrán

Founder at Sentience Research. Associate at the Organisation for the Prevention of Intense Suffering (OPIS).

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