Societies generalize constantly. We say that Russia invaded Ukraine, that Spain maintains bullfighting, that men commit most serious violence, or that dogs are eaten in some parts of Asia. These statements are not normally interpreted as literal claims about every member of a population. They function as shorthand for states, institutions, statistical patterns, or cultural practices.
Saying that Russia invaded Ukraine does not mean that every Russian citizen supported the invasion. Associating Spain with bullfighting does not make every Spaniard a supporter of it. Pointing out that men are overrepresented in certain violent crimes does not imply that all men are violent. Generalizations allow us to express an idea quickly, although they sacrifice some precision.
The problem arises when these forms of shorthand receive different treatment depending on the group to which they refer. Some generalizations are tolerated as ordinary simplifications. Others immediately trigger warnings about discrimination, collective blame, or essentialism. These differences may result from legitimate historical and moral considerations, but they may also be influenced by the expected cost of expressing certain criticisms.
The validity of a claim and the risk of expressing it
Two questions that are often confused should be separated.
The first is epistemic: whether a claim is supported by evidence, whether it accurately describes a statistical distribution, or whether it wrongly attributes to an entire group a characteristic observed only among some of its members.
The second is practical: what consequences the person making the statement may face.
Two statements may be equally inaccurate and yet generate very different reactions. Claiming that men are inherently violent and claiming that Muslims are inherently violent are both essentialist generalizations. Neither follows from the existence of statistical differences or from the actions of particular violent groups.
However, the cost of expressing them may not be the same. In some environments, the first statement may be treated as rhetorical exaggeration, receive only limited criticism, or even be accepted as part of a political discourse. The second may provoke much stronger institutional and reputational rejection and, in certain cases, threats or personal risk.
This difference in consequences does not make one statement true and the other false. It merely shows that the validity of an idea and the danger of expressing it are separate variables.
An intellectually consistent society should evaluate claims according to their evidence and precision. In practice, however, people also consider who may feel attacked, what reaction may follow, and what ability the affected group is believed to possess to punish, formally or informally, those who criticize it.
From individual fear to collective taboo
Some social taboos may be explained through a mechanism of anticipatory coercion. When there are precedents of severe retaliation against criticism, people begin to modify their behavior before receiving any direct threat.
A journalist may decide not to publish an illustration. A teacher may avoid an example. A comedian may withdraw a satire. An institution may adopt unusually cautious language. Each decision may appear prudent in isolation, but the accumulation of such decisions eventually creates a zone of silence.
Over time, fear ceases to be presented as fear. It may instead be described as respect, sensitivity, responsibility, or social coexistence. These motivations need not be mutually exclusive. A person may sincerely believe that an expression is offensive while also calculating that publishing it would involve an unnecessary risk.
This mechanism does not require most members of the criticized group to be violent. A small, unpredictable minority willing to impose extreme costs may be sufficient. A low probability of aggression can produce strong self-censorship when the possible consequences are severe.
The strength of a taboo therefore depends not only on the number of people belonging to a group or on its formal political power. It also depends on the perceived probability of retaliation, the expected severity of that retaliation, and the degree of confidence that institutions can protect those who exercise criticism.
Not all public respect is genuine respect
This distinction allows us to separate voluntary respect from coerced deference.
Voluntary respect arises from the conviction that a person, tradition, or institution deserves a certain degree of consideration. Coerced deference occurs when someone modifies their behavior because they fear the consequences of failing to do so.
From the outside, both forms of behavior may look the same: silence, careful language, absence of satire, or avoidance of certain subjects. Their causes, however, are different.
The absence of criticism of an authoritarian ruler does not prove that the population admires that ruler. It may show that criticism is dangerous. Similarly, a doctrine surrounded by a strong taboo may appear particularly respected when part of that apparent respect is actually produced by fear.
This helps explain a recurring paradox: more tolerant political and cultural systems receive more criticism because criticizing them is relatively safe. Less tolerant systems may receive less criticism because they have raised the cost of dissent.
A parliamentary monarchy may endure constant satire of the monarch without the system collapsing. Under a dictatorship, mocking the ruler may have grossly disproportionate consequences. The lower level of satire in the dictatorship does not necessarily indicate greater respect; it may indicate greater fear.
Muslims and Jews: similar taboos, potentially different causes
Muslims and Jews can both be subjected to collective blame, but the caution surrounding each group may have partly different foundations.
In the case of Jews, vigilance regarding certain generalizations is connected to a long history of persecution, exclusion, conspiracy theories, pogroms, and extermination. Collective accusations against Jews are not merely conceptual errors. Historically, they have played a role in legitimizing systematic violence.
Warnings against antisemitism can therefore be understood as a response to a demonstrated historical danger. Generalizations about supposed conspiracies, collective loyalties, or economic control are not isolated comments: they reproduce narratives that have had grave political and human consequences.
There are also clear reasons to avoid collective blame against Muslims. In many Western countries, Muslims constitute minorities exposed to discrimination, and terms such as Muslim, Arab, immigrant, and foreigner are frequently conflated. A criticism originally directed at a doctrine may easily turn into hostility toward people because of their origin, appearance, or identity.
However, caution regarding Islam may also contain an additional component: fear of violent reactions to certain criticisms, satires, religious depictions, acts of apostasy, or accusations of blasphemy. In that case, the protection surrounding the topic would arise not only from anti-discrimination norms but also from an intimidating effect.
The outward appearance may be similar in both cases: constant corrections, warnings, silence, and avoidance of certain formulations. Yet the causes may differ. In one context, the historical memory of persecution may dominate. In another, the expectation of present or future retaliation may carry greater weight.
This difference should be treated as a hypothesis requiring investigation, not as an automatic conclusion. It may also vary according to the country, the media environment, political orientation, and the specific form of criticism involved.
Criticizing a doctrine is not the same as blaming all its followers
An additional difficulty lies in distinguishing between religion, ideology, organization, and individuals.
Islam is a heterogeneous religious tradition. Islamism is a family of political ideologies. Jihadism refers to movements that legitimize particular forms of violence. Muslims are individuals with highly diverse religious and political positions. Confusing these categories leads both to unjust generalizations and to excessive restrictions on analysis.
It is possible to investigate whether particular Islamist movements are overrepresented in certain forms of terrorism. It is also possible to examine whether some religious interpretations legitimize violence, restrict freedom of expression, or subordinate individual rights to sacred authority.
Such investigations do not imply that all Muslims share those interpretations. But recognizing internal diversity does not require denying that certain doctrines may have causal effects.
The debate should not be reduced to two extreme positions: either Islam is treated as the general cause of violence, or every possible influence of Islamic interpretations is denied. A doctrine may operate as a partial cause, a justification, a mechanism of mobilization, a criterion for selecting enemies, or an instrument of coordination without explaining the entire phenomenon by itself.
The same standard should apply to Judaism, Christianity, nationalism, political ideologies, and every other system of belief.
Tolerance as a strategic disadvantage
Open societies generate more visible criticism because they allow their internal conflicts to be expressed. Governments are challenged, leaders are mocked, majority religions are criticized, and social injustices are publicly denounced.
This may create a misleading impression. Open systems appear to live in permanent conflict because their disagreements are visible. Authoritarian or strongly coercive systems may appear more cohesive because dissenting voices have been silenced.
A greater quantity of observable criticism does not necessarily imply a greater quantity of injustice. Likewise, a scarcity of criticism does not demonstrate harmony, approval, or genuine respect.
There may also be an unequal selection of targets for criticism. People tend to confront those they regard as tolerant more freely and to avoid those who might react dangerously. As a result, groups that accept disagreement receive more verbal attacks, while less tolerant groups acquire indirect protection.
Tolerance can therefore become a strategic disadvantage. Those who do not threaten others can be criticized without fear. Those who demonstrate that they may respond in extreme ways cause others to measure their words. The difference does not necessarily reflect who deserves more respect, but who has succeeded in raising the cost of criticism.
The perverse incentive created by intimidation
When a violent reaction succeeds in reducing future criticism, violence receives a political reward.
Institutions may end up restricting an expression not because it directly causes an illegitimate harm, but because they fear the response of those who feel offended. At that point, the person willing to use violence gains an indirect ability to set the boundaries of public expression.
Even in the absence of a formal legal prohibition, an informal rule may emerge and be enforced through threats, fear, and self-censorship. The state may not formally prohibit criticism, but it may also be unable to guarantee the safety of those who engage in it. The practical result can resemble a prohibition.
This mechanism creates a dangerous incentive: the more severe the reaction to criticism, the more likely it is that such criticism will disappear from public space. Intolerance becomes effective.
A society committed to freedom of expression should prevent threats from determining which ideas may be discussed. Protecting freedom of expression does not mean endorsing every expression. It means preventing violence or the threat of violence from becoming instruments of censorship.
How to use generalizations responsibly
The solution is not to prohibit every generalization. Public language could not function if every statement had to include every possible exception.
What matters is identifying the type of claim being made.
“Russia invaded Ukraine” is an institutional attribution referring to the state and its armed forces. “Men are overrepresented in serious violence” is a statistical claim. “Spain maintains bullfighting” describes a legal and cultural practice that exists in part of the country. None of these statements necessarily attributes individual responsibility to every member of the group.
The problem begins when a statement about institutions, statistics, or practices is transformed into a claim about the essence of individuals. The fact that a state invades another country does not mean that its citizens are inherently aggressive. The existence of a practice within a culture does not mean that all members of that culture support it. The overrepresentation of a population in a particular behavior does not prove that all its members are naturally predisposed to that behavior.
The standard should be the same for religions, nationalities, cultures, sexes, and ideologies. Distributions, institutions, doctrines, and causal mechanisms may all be analyzed. What should be avoided is the automatic conversion of those analyses into collective individual guilt or claims about a supposedly immutable group nature.
Consequences of this asymmetry
The first consequence is epistemic: the cost of expressing an idea can distort research. Topics that are dangerous or socially sanctioned receive less analysis, regardless of their importance.
The second is political: intolerant actors may receive greater protection than tolerant ones. This indirectly rewards threats.
The third is moral: societies may confuse prudence with virtue. Avoiding criticism out of fear may be presented as ethical sensitivity even when its real cause is risk calculation.
The fourth is institutional: universities, media organizations, and public administrations may apply different standards according to the expected reaction of each group. The governing principle ceases to be the accuracy of the statement and becomes the affected group’s capacity to create difficulties.
The fifth is cultural: criticism becomes concentrated on groups that tolerate it. This may create an inverted picture of power and responsibility. The most open actors appear to be the most questioned, while the most repressive appear to be the most respected.
Conclusion
The strength of a social taboo may arise from several sources: concern for a vulnerable group, historical memory, anti-discrimination norms, reputational sanctions, political interests, and fear of retaliation. These causes may coexist and carry different weight in different contexts.
The special caution surrounding certain forms of criticism should therefore not automatically be interpreted as evidence of greater moral sensitivity. In some cases, it may represent a legitimate defense against collective blame. In others, it may reflect a rational adaptation to risk. In still others, both elements may be present.
The fundamental paradox is that tolerance facilitates criticism, while intolerance may create the appearance of respect. Open societies, religions that accept disagreement, and groups that reject violence may receive more verbal attacks precisely because criticizing them is safe. Actors who punish dissent may receive less criticism because they have successfully raised its cost.
An intellectually consistent society should resist this inversion. Claims should be judged according to their evidence, precision, and explanatory power, not according to the fear produced by expressing them or the capacity of the affected group to punish those who do so.
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