Tolerance, Taboo, and the Changing Dynamics of Power
In a broadly environmental and rhetorical context, someone can say that “humanity is a cancer on the planet,” that human beings are a plague, or that our species is destroying a magnificent ecosystem.
These statements are generally understood as hyperbolic criticisms of humanity’s environmental impact rather than as literal proposals to eliminate human beings. Although they attribute something extremely negative to the entire species, they rarely provoke an intensely hostile personal reaction against the speaker. They may be regarded as exaggerated, pessimistic, or intellectually simplistic, but they are usually accepted as recognizable environmental rhetoric.
The reaction is very different when someone says that women are a problem, that men are inherently dangerous, that Islam is incompatible with Western civilization, or that Jews constitute a collective threat. The speaker may immediately be classified as misogynistic, misandrist, Islamophobic, antisemitic, intolerant, or dangerous, sometimes before the meaning, mechanism, or evidence behind the claim has been examined.
This asymmetry is grounded in important differences.
When someone condemns humanity as a whole, they normally include themselves in the accusation. The target is universal and diffuse. The statement does not clearly separate an innocent “us” from a guilty “them,” and it is difficult to convert it into a practical criterion for excluding particular individuals.
When women, men, Muslims, Jews, or another identifiable group are singled out, however, a boundary is created between “us” and “them.” The statement can then be used to justify unequal treatment, exclusion, restrictions, or the attribution of collective guilt to identifiable people.
History also matters. Descriptions of human groups as diseases, plagues, parasites, or collective threats have accompanied real processes of discrimination and persecution. When the targeted group is perceived as vulnerable, the statement may therefore be interpreted not merely as an exaggerated opinion, but as a possible justification for depriving individuals of rights.
This helps explain why these statements do not produce identical reactions. But explaining the asymmetry does not demonstrate that its full extent is justified.
The validity of a claim and the risk of expressing it
Two questions that are frequently confused should be separated.
The first is epistemic: is the claim supported by evidence? Does it describe a real statistical pattern, institutional tendency, doctrine, or causal mechanism? Or does it transform the behavior of some members of a group into a supposedly universal characteristic?
The second is practical: what consequences may follow from expressing the claim?
Two statements can be equally inaccurate and still produce radically different reactions. Saying that men are inherently violent and saying that Muslims are inherently violent are both essentialist generalizations. Neither follows from the existence of statistical differences, historical patterns, or violent organizations associated with some members of either category.
Yet the social cost of expressing the two statements may differ considerably. In some environments, the first may be treated as a rhetorical exaggeration, tolerated as part of a political discourse, or challenged only mildly. The second may provoke much stronger reputational, professional, institutional, or even personal consequences.
The reverse can also occur in other cultural contexts. A hostile generalization about women may be normalized while criticism of men is discouraged. A negative claim about Jews may be dangerous in one society and socially rewarded in another. A criticism of Islam may be protected by law but avoided informally because of anticipated reactions.
These differences in consequences do not determine which statement is true. They reveal that the validity of an idea and the cost of expressing it are separate variables.
An intellectually consistent society should evaluate claims primarily according to evidence, precision, explanatory power, and openness to refutation. In practice, however, people also consider who may feel attacked, what response may follow, and what ability the affected group or its defenders possess to punish the speaker.
This punishment need not be legal or physical. It may involve professional exclusion, public denunciation, reputational destruction, social isolation, administrative investigation, coordinated complaints, loss of employment, or the possibility of violence.
The boundaries of public discussion are therefore shaped not only by moral principles, but also by expectations about consequences.
From protection against discrimination to immunity from criticism
In some political and cultural environments, there has been a movement from a reasonable principle:
“Vulnerable individuals should be protected from discrimination and dehumanization.”
Toward a much broader and more questionable principle:
“Groups classified as vulnerable should be protected from criticism.”
The distinction between these principles is fundamental.
The first protects people. It rejects collective guilt, arbitrary discrimination, violence, and the reduction of individuals to inherited categories.
The second can protect doctrines, institutions, organizations, practices, and political projects from examination merely because they are associated with a group regarded as vulnerable.
At the same time, groups classified as powerful may become acceptable targets for almost unlimited hostility. Statements such as “men are trash,” “the rich are parasites,” “Westerners are evil,” or “humanity is a cancer” may be tolerated because their targets are considered dominant, privileged, or collectively responsible.
This creates a double standard.
The fact that a generalization against a vulnerable group may produce more dangerous consequences does not mean that the group should be exempt from criticism. Nor does the relative power of another group make every form of contempt directed against it legitimate.
A reasonable standard should not consist in deciding which human categories may be attacked and which may never be questioned. It should distinguish between individuals, ideas, doctrines, institutions, organizations, laws, incentives, behavior, statistical patterns, and measurable consequences.
Individuals should not be presumed guilty merely because they belong to a category. Ideas, institutions, laws, and practices must remain open to criticism, including when they are associated with groups considered vulnerable.
Without this distinction, protection against collective hostility can gradually become protection against intellectual scrutiny.
Generalizations are unavoidable, but they are not all the same
Public language depends on generalization.
We say that Russia invaded Ukraine, that Spain maintains bullfighting, that men commit most serious interpersonal violence, or that particular cultural practices exist in certain parts of the world.
These statements are not normally interpreted as literal claims about every person belonging to the population mentioned. They function as shorthand for states, institutions, statistical distributions, or cultural practices.
Saying that Russia invaded Ukraine does not mean that every Russian citizen approved of the invasion. Saying that Spain maintains bullfighting does not mean that every Spaniard supports it. Saying that men are statistically overrepresented in particular violent crimes does not mean that every man is violent.
Generalizations allow complex patterns to be expressed efficiently, but they sacrifice precision. The relevant question is therefore not whether a sentence refers to a group, but what type of attribution it makes.
“Russia invaded Ukraine” is primarily an institutional attribution referring to a state and its armed forces.
“Men are overrepresented in serious violence” is a statistical claim about a distribution.
“Some interpretations of Islam punish apostasy” is a doctrinal and legal claim.
“Jews control society” is a sweeping collective attribution that would require extraordinary evidence and has historically been associated with conspiratorial narratives.
“Women are incompatible with civilization” is an essentialist judgment applied to billions of individuals.
The problem begins when an observation about an institution, distribution, doctrine, or practice is transformed into a claim about the essence of every individual in a category.
A state can act without the agreement of all its citizens. A doctrine can have causal effects without being accepted by every nominal follower. A population can be statistically overrepresented in a behavior without every member being predisposed to it. A cultural practice can exist without defining an entire culture.
The same standard should be applied to sexes, religions, nationalities, ethnic groups, social classes, and political identities.
Tolerance facilitates criticism
Open and tolerant systems generate more visible criticism because criticism is permitted.
Governments are challenged, leaders are mocked, majority religions are questioned, national histories are revised, and institutional failures are publicly exposed. This may create the impression that tolerant societies are permanently divided or uniquely defective.
Less tolerant systems may appear more cohesive because dissenting voices have been silenced, intimidated, or pushed into private spaces.
The amount of observable criticism is therefore not a simple measure of the amount of injustice.
A tolerant institution may receive constant complaints precisely because its members expect complaints to be heard. An authoritarian institution may receive few complaints because speaking is costly.
The absence of satire does not demonstrate admiration. The absence of criticism does not demonstrate agreement. Silence may reflect genuine respect, but it may also reflect fear.
A parliamentary monarchy may endure continuous mockery of the monarch without collapsing. A dictatorship may display almost no public mockery of its ruler. The difference does not necessarily show that the dictator is more respected. It may show that the consequences of ridicule are radically different.
This produces a recurring paradox:
Tolerance facilitates criticism, while intolerance can create the appearance of respect.
Groups, religions, institutions, and political systems that accept disagreement become safer targets. Those that demonstrate a capacity or willingness to punish disagreement become more dangerous targets.
As a result, public criticism may become concentrated on the actors least likely to retaliate.
Voluntary respect and coerced deference
It is useful to distinguish voluntary respect from coerced deference.
Voluntary respect arises from the belief that a person, tradition, institution, or group deserves consideration.
Coerced deference arises when someone modifies their behavior because the consequences of failing to do so appear dangerous.
From the outside, the two can look identical. Both may produce silence, careful language, avoidance of satire, or reluctance to discuss particular subjects.
Their causes, however, are different.
A journalist may avoid publishing an image because they believe it is gratuitously offensive. They may also avoid it because similar publications have led to threats or attacks. Both motives can coexist.
A teacher may avoid a controversial example because it would distract from the lesson. They may also fear complaints, disciplinary proceedings, or reputational consequences.
A comedian may remove a joke because it is weak or cruel. They may also calculate that some targets are more likely than others to organize retaliation.
Over time, fear may cease to be described as fear. It may be reframed as sensitivity, responsibility, coexistence, or respect.
These concepts are not necessarily false descriptions. A person can sincerely value sensitivity while also responding to risk. The problem arises when societies refuse to examine how much apparent respect is generated voluntarily and how much is produced by anticipated punishment.
From individual fear to collective taboo
Social taboos can emerge through a process of anticipatory coercion.
Direct censorship is not always necessary. If there are precedents of severe retaliation, people begin to modify their behavior before receiving a personal threat.
A journalist decides not to publish. A teacher changes the example. A publisher rejects a manuscript. A platform removes a discussion. An institution adopts increasingly cautious language.
Each decision may appear prudent in isolation. The cumulative result is a zone of silence.
This mechanism does not require most members of the criticized group to be violent, intolerant, or politically coordinated. A small and unpredictable minority capable of imposing extreme costs may be sufficient.
Risk depends not only on probability but also on severity. Even a low probability of physical attack, professional destruction, or prolonged harassment can generate substantial self-censorship.
The strength of a taboo therefore depends on several variables:
- the perceived probability of retaliation;
- the expected severity of retaliation;
- the visibility of previous punishments;
- the organizational capacity of offended actors;
- the ability of institutions to protect critics;
- the degree of reputational legitimacy attached to punishing the criticism.
A group may possess little formal political power and still exercise substantial influence over speech if criticizing it is perceived as unusually costly.
Conversely, a group may occupy many formal positions of power but receive constant criticism because it is expected to tolerate attacks without retaliation.
Power over public discourse cannot therefore be measured exclusively by population, wealth, elected office, or formal authority. The capacity to impose costs on critics is itself a form of power.
The strategic reward of intolerance
When intimidation successfully reduces future criticism, intolerance receives a political reward.
An institution may restrict an expression not because the expression itself directly violates another person’s rights, but because administrators fear the response of those who will claim to be offended.
At that point, the actor most willing to threaten disruption acquires indirect influence over the boundaries of public expression.
The state may not formally prohibit criticism. Yet if it cannot protect those who engage in it, the practical result can resemble prohibition.
This creates a dangerous incentive.
If peaceful objection produces debate but threats produce cancellation, threats become more effective than arguments.
If tolerant groups continue to receive criticism while intolerant groups become protected by fear, intolerance becomes strategically advantageous.
The problem is not limited to physical violence. Coordinated reputational campaigns, professional pressure, administrative harassment, and strategic litigation can perform similar functions, although their legitimacy must be evaluated separately in each case.
A society committed to freedom of expression should prevent the threat of disproportionate retaliation from determining what may be discussed.
Protecting expression does not mean approving every claim. It means keeping the response to bad arguments within a framework of counterargument, evidence, criticism, and proportionate law rather than allowing intimidation to establish informal taboos.
Muslims and Jews: similar caution, different possible mechanisms
Muslims and Jews can both be subjected to collective blame, but caution surrounding criticism of these groups may arise from partly different combinations of causes.
In the case of Jews, vigilance toward certain generalizations is strongly connected to a long history of exclusion, conspiracy theories, pogroms, forced displacement, and extermination.
Claims about secret Jewish control, collective disloyalty, economic domination, or hidden coordination are not merely abstract logical errors. Narratives of this kind have repeatedly been used to legitimize discrimination and violence.
Warnings against antisemitism can therefore reflect the memory of demonstrated historical danger.
There are similarly strong reasons to avoid collective blame against Muslims. In many Western societies, Muslims are minorities exposed to prejudice, and the categories Muslim, Arab, immigrant, foreigner, and Islamist are frequently conflated.
A criticism directed at a doctrine or organization can easily become hostility toward individuals because of their name, origin, appearance, or presumed identity.
At the same time, caution surrounding Islam may, in some contexts, contain an additional element: fear of retaliation against satire, apostasy, blasphemy, religious depictions, or criticism of sacred authority.
Where this occurs, the protection surrounding the topic may arise from both anti-discrimination principles and an intimidating effect.
The outward appearance can be similar in both cases: careful language, frequent warnings, correction of generalizations, institutional caution, and avoidance of certain subjects.
The underlying mechanisms may differ in relative weight.
In one context, historical memory of persecution may dominate. In another, contemporary fear of retaliation may be more important. In many cases, both factors may coexist with ordinary political interests, reputational incentives, and sincere concern for vulnerable individuals.
These possibilities should be treated as hypotheses requiring contextual investigation, not as automatic conclusions about either group.
Muslim and Jewish communities are internally diverse. Neither should be treated as possessing a single doctrine, strategy, interest, or level of power.
Their relative positions have varied substantially across countries, historical periods, territories, institutions, and dimensions of social life. A group can be vulnerable in one setting, influential in another, or simultaneously protected in some respects and exposed in others.
Criticizing doctrines is not the same as blaming followers
An additional difficulty lies in distinguishing religions, ideologies, organizations, and individuals.
Islam is a heterogeneous religious tradition. Islamism refers to families of political ideologies. Jihadism refers to movements that justify particular forms of violence. Muslims are individuals with widely different beliefs, levels of observance, cultural backgrounds, and political positions.
Judaism can refer to a religion, a civilization, a legal tradition, an ancestry, or a cultural identity. Zionism includes different political traditions. The policies of the Israeli government are not equivalent to the beliefs or responsibilities of every Jewish person.
Similar distinctions apply to Christianity, feminism, nationalism, liberalism, socialism, environmentalism, and every other broad tradition.
Confusing categories creates two opposite errors.
The first is collective blame: attributing the doctrine or behavior of an organization to every individual associated with a larger identity.
The second is analytical paralysis: treating every criticism of a doctrine or organization as an attack on all individuals who share a related identity.
It should be possible to investigate whether particular Islamist movements contribute to terrorism, whether some interpretations of religious law restrict freedom of expression, or whether specific political organizations promote discriminatory policies.
It should also be possible to investigate extremist Jewish movements, Christian nationalism, revolutionary ideologies, feminist legislation, male-dominated institutions, or any other system of beliefs and incentives.
Recognizing internal diversity does not require denying that doctrines can have causal effects.
A doctrine may function as a justification, a mechanism of mobilization, a criterion for selecting enemies, a source of legitimacy, or an instrument of coordination without explaining an entire phenomenon by itself.
The correct alternative is neither collective condemnation nor compulsory denial of causal influence. It is precise analysis.
Power is dynamic
The deeper problem is that vulnerability and power are not permanent conditions.
A group can grow or shrink, organize or fragment, form alliances, acquire institutional influence, lose it, become culturally dominant, or move between positions of vulnerability and power.
These transformations have occurred repeatedly with religious, political, ethnic, economic, and cultural groups.
A group that is numerically small may possess substantial institutional, economic, cultural, or organizational influence.
A numerical majority may remain politically fragmented, economically weak, institutionally excluded, or incapable of acting collectively.
A group may control one institution while remaining vulnerable in another. It may possess cultural legitimacy but limited economic resources. It may have formal legal protection but face physical insecurity. It may be politically influential at the national level but locally marginalized, or the reverse.
Power is therefore multidimensional.
For religious groups, part of the dynamic can be studied through demographic variables:
- population size;
- proportion of the total population;
- territorial concentration;
- migration;
- birth rates;
- conversion;
- transitions from majority to minority or from minority to majority.
Some societies that were not originally Muslim became, through complex historical processes, majority-Muslim societies governed by Islamic institutions.
This does not mean that every contemporary Muslim population will follow the same trajectory. Nor does it justify treating individual Muslims as enemies or assuming that they share a coordinated political project.
It means something more limited: demographic and political positions are not permanent.
Present minority status does not guarantee permanent weakness, just as present majority status does not guarantee permanent control.
A society that treats critical examination of a group as unacceptable while that group has relatively little power may discover later that the same group has acquired enough influence to restrict the debate that previously protected it.
Protection from discrimination should therefore not become permanent immunity from scrutiny of doctrines, political strategies, demographic changes, institutional objectives, or social consequences.
But demographic factors do not determine political power by themselves. A numerical majority can be institutionally weak, while a relatively small but highly organized group can possess considerable influence.
Demography is one relevant variable, not a complete measure of power.
Women and men make the multidimensional nature of power clearer
This becomes even clearer when we consider the relationship between women and men.
Their demographic proportions remain broadly similar, yet their relative power can change substantially over time and across institutions. These changes cannot be explained primarily by increases or decreases in population size. They become visible through political, legal, economic, cultural, familial, and institutional variables.
Relevant indicators may include:
- representation in government and political organizations;
- presence in the judiciary and public administration;
- access to education and management positions;
- influence over legislation;
- participation in media and cultural institutions;
- distribution of public and private resources;
- differential legal protections;
- social credibility;
- family responsibilities;
- exposure to physical and sexual violence;
- occupational risk;
- criminal punishment;
- military obligations;
- homelessness and suicide;
- custody arrangements;
- procedural consequences associated with particular accusations.
The relevant question is not whether the number of women or men is increasing, but whether the distribution of authority, responsibility, protection, obligations, institutional influence, and legal safeguards between them is changing in particular areas.
This prevents a simplistic description of either sex as universally powerful or universally vulnerable.
Men may retain greater influence in some economic or political structures while being more exposed in areas such as dangerous employment, criminal punishment, homelessness, suicide, military obligations, or certain family disputes.
Women may remain more vulnerable to particular forms of violence, reproductive burdens, economic dependency, or exclusion from some positions while acquiring greater influence or stronger protection in other institutional contexts.
Advantages and disadvantages do not necessarily move together.
A population can be protected in one legal domain and disadvantaged in another. Greater representation in one institution does not eliminate vulnerability elsewhere. Historical exclusion does not prove present weakness in every area, just as historical dominance does not prove present advantage for every individual.
The analysis must therefore remain specific: which institution, which power, which protection, which obligation, which period, and which measurable consequence?
Protective policies and new asymmetries
Policies designed to correct historical or present injustices may be necessary and may produce real improvements.
However, policies are not automatically just simply because their original purpose was protective.
They can also create new inequalities if they weaken safeguards for one side, establish formal or informal presumptions, assign different standards of credibility, obscure the interests of disfavored victims, or impose serious consequences before the relevant facts have been conclusively determined.
Proceedings involving violence, custody, or family relations illustrate the difficulty.
Preventive measures may be justified to avoid grave and irreversible harm. Waiting for complete certainty can expose a possible victim or a child to unacceptable danger.
Yet preventive measures can also cause serious injustice if they remain in force for months or years and the accusation is ultimately not proven.
Separating a parent from their children, removing someone from their home, restricting communication, freezing resources, or imposing substantial limitations may become a punishment in practice when proceedings are excessively delayed.
Recognizing this possibility does not mean denying violence against women or men, assuming that complainants generally lie, or claiming that either sex operates as a coordinated political bloc.
It means recognizing a general principle:
“Every form of institutional power, including power created for protective purposes, must remain subject to evidence, proportionality, review, procedural safeguards, correction, and, where possible, repair.”
Protection is necessary precisely because some harms cannot be reversed. Procedural safeguards are necessary for the same reason: measures intended to prevent one irreversible harm can generate another.
The alignment produced by coercive power
Intolerance may do more than silence critics. It may also encourage vulnerable individuals to align with, defend, and eventually legitimize actors capable of imposing high costs.
People frequently adapt to unequal distributions of power. They may comply with a dominant coalition, attach themselves to a protector, avoid provoking the likely victor, or rationalize an arrangement on which their safety depends.
This mechanism is not exclusive to women or to any particular group. Men also submit to stronger coalitions, support authoritarian leaders under threat, and align with victorious factions.
Historical differences in exposure to physical violence, economic dependency, family structure, and access to protection may nevertheless make the mechanism operate differently across populations and contexts.
What appears publicly as admiration or ideological agreement may sometimes include strategic adaptation.
Over time, strategic alignment can become sincere belief. People tend to justify durable arrangements on which their security, identity, or livelihood depends. An authority initially obeyed out of fear may later be described as legitimate, necessary, protective, or morally superior.
Coercive power may therefore produce not only silence, but also public support.
This reinforces the appearance of consensus surrounding actors who punish dissent.
The consequences of asymmetric criticism
The first consequence is epistemic.
The cost of expressing an idea can distort research. Topics associated with professional, social, or personal danger receive less investigation, regardless of their importance.
Researchers may avoid hypotheses that could be interpreted as offensive. Institutions may prefer explanations that generate fewer conflicts. Data may remain available while causal questions remain unasked.
The second consequence is political.
Intolerant actors may receive more protection than tolerant ones. If extreme reactions successfully discourage scrutiny, intimidation is indirectly rewarded.
The third consequence is moral.
Societies may confuse prudence with virtue. Avoiding criticism because it is dangerous may be presented as moral sensitivity, even when fear is an important part of the explanation.
The fourth consequence is institutional.
Universities, media organizations, technology platforms, and public administrations may apply different standards according to the expected reaction of each affected group. The governing principle ceases to be the quality of the claim and becomes the capacity of interested actors to create difficulties.
The fifth consequence is cultural.
Criticism becomes concentrated on groups that tolerate it. This can create an inverted picture of responsibility. The actors most open to scrutiny appear constantly defective, while those most capable of suppressing criticism appear unusually respected.
The sixth consequence is strategic.
Groups learn which behaviors generate protection. If tolerance produces more criticism while intimidation produces silence, social systems select against tolerance.
The reversibility test
A social rule is safe only if we would accept it after the balance of power had changed.
If a group is protected from criticism because it currently has less power, we should ask whether we would accept the same immunity if it later controlled institutions.
If dehumanizing rhetoric against a group is tolerated because it is currently regarded as powerful, we should ask whether we would still consider that rhetoric acceptable if the group later became vulnerable.
If historical victimhood is used to protect a contemporary political project from examination, we should ask whether the same rule would be acceptable when applied by other groups with histories of suffering.
If historical power is used to attribute permanent guilt to current individuals, we should ask whether inherited responsibility is a principle we are willing to universalize.
This reversibility test does not require ignoring context.
The same statement can create different levels of danger depending on the target, the speaker, the historical setting, the institutional environment, and the capacity to transform rhetoric into action.
A statement directed against a persecuted minority may carry implications that an abstract criticism of humanity does not.
Context should influence the degree of caution, the interpretation of intent, and the assessment of foreseeable harm.
But context should not eliminate universal standards.
Conclusion
The strength of a social taboo may arise from several sources: concern for vulnerable individuals, historical memory, anti-discrimination norms, reputational sanctions, political interests, institutional incentives, and fear of retaliation.
These causes can coexist and carry different weight in different circumstances.
The special caution surrounding certain forms of criticism should therefore not automatically be interpreted as evidence of greater moral sensitivity. In some cases, it represents a legitimate defense against collective blame. In others, it reflects rational adaptation to risk. In many cases, both elements are present.
The fundamental paradox is that tolerance facilitates criticism, while intolerance can create the appearance of respect.
Open societies, religions that accept disagreement, institutions that tolerate satire, and groups that reject retaliation may receive more verbal attacks precisely because criticizing them is safe.
Actors who punish dissent may receive less criticism because they have successfully raised its cost.
An intellectually consistent society should resist this inversion.
Individuals should be protected from violence, discrimination, collective guilt, and dehumanization. But no religion, ideology, institution, law, political movement, or structure of power should be exempt from criticism.
Claims should be judged according to their evidence, precision, explanatory power, and consequences—not according to the fear produced by expressing them or the capacity of the affected group to punish those who do so.
The balanced alternative is neither perfect symmetry without context nor permanent asymmetric protection.
It is neither unlimited hostility toward groups classified as powerful nor intellectual immunity for groups classified as vulnerable.
It is to judge individuals as individuals, examine doctrines as doctrines, analyze distributions as distributions, evaluate institutions by their results, distinguish respect from fear, and continually reassess power as it changes across time, places, and social domains.
