A defense of Epiphenomenalism
Summary
If we assume that sentience (and motivation) plays a role in evolution, we should look for it into quantum effects / non-computational scope.
When it is stated that sentience has a purpose, this idea is usually explained by indicating that sentience is useful because it motivates doing certain things and avoiding others. In addition, in this explanation, it is usually indicated that sentience motivates but does not force. That is, under this explanation, sentience is not simply the cause; and behavior the consequence, but sentience motivates to strive to make the best possible decision, under the threat of pain and the reward of pleasure. According to this explanation, sentient beings would make better decisions and will be selected (“better”, from an evolutionary point of view). In this text I criticize this idea and propose alternatives. While analyzing the alternatives, I conclude that if sentience were useful, then sentience should incorporate some element that goes beyond classical physics. For example, related to quantum physics or the multiverse, and that these elements should play a role, not only as conditions for the appearance of sentience, but as benefits of it, which make it useful. And why should the limit be in classical physics? Because classical physics is the field in which the evolution of matter takes place, and this must be overcome so that a competitive advantage can be attributed to sentience.
Is sentience useful or inevitable?
It is very intuitive to believe that sentience motivates us to make (better) decisions (“better”, from an evolutionary point of view).
But we can also consider that it is possible that we are sentient robots, but without will, that we simply do what we have been programmed for, even though we have the feeling that we make free decisions, so that sentience really does not play any role in the evolution in form of motivation.
If there is no will, then the apparent motivation produced by sentience would also be an illusion. Sentience would be a byproduct of certain physical conditions, or something ubiquitous (Panpsychism). Sentience would appear to be evolutionarily useful, and yet what would be evolutionarily useful would be such physical conditions.
Of course, the interpretation we make of this will depend a lot on the meaning we give to words like “freedom”, “will” or “free will.” It can be understood for example that a robot programmed to operate by certain criteria is free because it works precisely with those criteria, which are its own. In this text I develop a little more the ideas of freedom. In any case, what is discussed here is whether sentience may or may not be a differential factor in evolution, because it motivates certain decisions that otherwise would not have been taken.
In summary, in all this text I defend these two ideas:
- That sentience is probably inevitable when certain conditions are met. And then it is not very correct to say that sentience is useful.
- That if, however, sentience were useful, then sentience must incorporate some element that goes beyond classical physics. For example, related to quantum physics or the multiverse.
How can motivation be indifferent?
Physics offers a very complete description of the reality in which free will does not exist and is not necessary. However, we have the feeling that we make decisions and this intuition is very strong.
It could be considered that the existence of the congenital insensitivity to pain is a definitive argument in favor of the idea that sentience is useful. If we do not feel pain when we burn, we would stop being careful and we would damage our body. This is exactly the risk run by people suffering from congenital insensitivity to pain.
Indeed, this seems to indicate that without adequate motivation (due to pleasure or pain), the body would not react by doing what is evolutionarily more advantageous (survive and reproduce).
However, we can still consider another possibility. For example, suppose an object that is too hot approaches me. Under normal circumstances my reaction will be to feel pain and get away. Whether I do it in reflex form or in a more conscious and elaborate way, in both cases it could happen that my body (including my brain) is simply programmed to react in a certain way and at the same time, perhaps as an inevitable consequence of the above (as a by-product), to experience a certain sensation. And in the case of congenital insensitivity to pain, my body would not do either of the two things: it would not feel pain or move away.
That is, it is possible that the damage in some tissues (material event) produces the emergence of the painful sensation (experiential event), and that, in turn, this subjective event (which is not something material, but is found in the world of the experiences) act on the matter, giving the order to the body to separate (and in this case, the matter would not be following the laws of the classic physics, but the matter would be being influenced by an experience, by something that does not it is material).
But it could also happen that tissue damage produces at the same time both the physical reaction of departing and the painful sensation, the latter being not useful, but inevitable, because it is intrinsically linked to the reaction of departing (and in this case the experiential event would have no effect on the material world).
How could sentience play a role in evolution?
As I said at the beginning, it is very intuitive to believe that sentience motivates us to make decisions. But we can also consider that it is possible that we are sentient robots, but without the “free will”, although we have the feeling that we make real decisions.
I have not demonstrated that we are sentient robots without will, but I have explained how this would be possible, and above all, what I have tried to explain is how we may have experiences and that these experiences do not play an evolutionary role.
Now I will assume that sentience represents an evolutionary advantage and see how this could happen.
I start from the assumption that the theory of evolution is true, and that evolution can be explained in a reductionist way, alluding to the properties of the universe and matter, through classical physics and chemistry.
It is important to clarify that I consider evolution as a high level description of something that happens in a world governed by certain laws. That world can be the physical world or a simulated world on a computer. The important thing is that certain worlds governed by certain laws will cause evolution to arise; that is, talking about evolution will be a summary way of describing what happens in these worlds. On the other hand, in other worlds, where the laws of physics are different, evolution will not occur, that is, evolution will not be a good way to describe in a summary way what is happening in that world.
My best intuition is that sentience is probably inevitable when certain conditions are met. So, sentience would be inevitable. Not useful. But let’s assume for a moment that sentience is useful. If sentience were useful, then sentience must incorporate some element that goes beyond classical physics, to be really useful. For example, related to quantum physics or the multiverse.
Why?
Because if sentience had a positive effect (in the form of motivation) on survival, in some way that can be explained by classical chemistry and physics, for example, thinking faster, taking better decisions, or being able to escape running faster than a predator, this behavior, that would be evolutionarily selected, would have to compete with another behavior that would also be evolutionarily selected, which is to do exactly the same, following the laws of chemistry and classical physics, but without the sentience.
That is, if the sentience were evolutionarily indifferent, there could be sentience (as a byproduct) or not, and that is exactly what it believe that is happening. Then sentience would not be useful: it would be inevitable.
If sentience instead had a differential positive effect on evolutionary fitness (in the form of motivation), it should have it in some way that was better than what machines that do not feel are capable of achieving.
Effectively, this could happen. But it would have to be in some way that goes beyond the laws of classical physics.
I will give an example to try to illustrate all this.
Suppose we have a DNA chain that “reproduces as much as possible” and that follows the laws of classical physics. Suppose this chain does not feel.
By the way, when I say that the chain “reproduces as much as possible” I am not assigning agency, but summarizing in that phrase what is happening on a physical level. That chain that “reproduces as much as possible” is simply matter following the laws of physics. The phrase “reproduces as much as possible” is a summary way of describing what is happening.
We also have a second strand of DNA also formed by physical particles and obviously also that “reproduces as much as possible.” However, this DNA chain does feel: it feels pleasure every time it reproduces and frustration if it can not. Which motivates it to reproduce as much as possible.
This second strand of DNA is motivated to reproduce, but in what physical way would it be able to do it better than the chain that does not feel, and therefore is not “motivated”?
Whichever way we imagine that this second chain can do something better than the first chain, if it is following the laws of classic physics, it is something that chains like the first one could also perform. That is, evolution could always create chains that do not feel, like the first one, and that would have that characteristic of being more efficient, like the second one. Then both types of chain could exist: those that feel and those that do not feel. Motivation would not have any differential advantage.
If instead of DNA chains we think about complete individuals like us, the example works the same. If we explain our entire reality from the perspective of classical physics and we do not include sentience as something useful, but as an emergent by-product, there is no problem. But if we explain our entire reality from the perspective of classical physics and at the same time we consider that pleasure and pain motivate us (in a way that is relevant to us as individuals and therefore relevant for the selective pressure), the difference caused by that motivation must have its basis in something beyond classical physics, otherwise there would be no possible difference.
Obviously, if we consider that from a certain level of complexity or when certain functions appear, all the chains (or individuals) feel, then it would seem that sentience plays a role in evolution, but simply what would be happening is that sentience is a byproduct of something else. And it is that other thing (complexity, function) the thing that is being selected, not sentience. Sentience would not be useful: it would be inevitable.
If it were true that sentience motivates and that this plays an evolutionary role, we would have to introduce some other factor: quantum physics, microtubules, multiverses… something that grants differential properties to the beings that they feel, so that in doing so they achieve some metaphysical advantageous characteristic, against which evolution working on simple classical matter can not compete.
In short, either sentience is evolutionarily indifferent, or sentience is grounded in something beyond classical physics.
I’m going to suggest some ways in which this could happen:
- Metaphysical hypothesis 1: The beings that feel, through their sentience, send messages to the multiverse with the problem they need to solve, receiving help from their twins in the multiverse, which puts them in a position of advantage over other objects in our universe that do not have that extra help.
- Metaphysical hypothesis 2: The beings that feel, especially if they are similar (family, genetically close), send messages to each other through an “ether” or “invisible thread” that we do not understand well, but that is not part of our physical universe. These messages contain valuable information which gives them a competitive advantage (for example, sending a “meta-message” to a relative asking for help) versus other material structures that do not feel and are not capable of sending those “meta-messages”.
As I say, on the one hand, these explanations are possible. On the other hand, I see them as somewhat arbitrary, forced, motivated by wanting to cling to the very intuitive idea that we make decisions. Perhaps we simply have the feeling that we make decisions when it really is not. This option seems more reasonable or at least as plausible to me as the whole set of “metaphysical hypotheses” that we can imagine to explain why experiences play a role in evolution.
In short, suffering could have a role in evolution, in the form of motivation. But for this to be true, emergentism would have to be false, and on the contrary, some “Particle” type theory should be true.
If suffering had a role in evolution, we would be closer to demonstrating that animals in nature (r-strategy) suffer less the more offspring they have as Zach Groff suggests. This would offer a much more positive net valuation of wildlife on Earth and would mark the strategy of animal welfare. But if suffering is inevitable, a by-product that has no effect on evolution, then the argument raised by Zach Groff that high reproductive rates could be linked to less suffering in death would not be valid.But if suffering is inevitable, a by-product that has no effect on evolution, then we can keep considering that, sadly, high reproductive rates are linked to large amounts of suffering.
Debate on this last point:
Summary here:
Facebook debate:
https://www.facebook.com/groups/suffering.in.nature/permalink/2727855270577587/
https://www.facebook.com/groups/EffectiveAnimalAdvocacy/permalink/1226384277532441/
Why can’t sentience be inevitable and at the same time evolutionarily useful?
Suppose sentience is inevitable when certain conditions exist. For example, suppose that it is inevitable that sentience arises when at least a certain number of information processors (neurons) are available and that the amount of sentience is a function that depends on the number of neurons.
Under that assumption, and from the individual point of view, each being who feels can find that their sentience, which is inevitable, is useful, because for example, it helps to ensure their survival by motivating them to move away from the sources of intense heat that can damage their bodies. But here we are talking about evolutionary utility. Another individual with exactly the same number of neurons would have exactly the same amount of sentience.
If sentience is inevitable (consequence of certain material aspects), then sentience does not make a difference between two individuals. That is, it would not be differentially useful. For sentience to be differentially useful (evolutionarily useful), an individual of 1,000 neurons should be able to have more sentience than another individual who also has 1,000 neurons. And this contradicts the initial assumption: that the amount of sentience is a function that depends on the number of neurons. As a consequence, if sentience is evolutionarily useful, then it is not inevitable; or at least it cannot depend solely on the material factors on which evolution is based.
Someone might think that this happens because sentience does not depend on the determined number of information processors. But we would reach the same conclusion assuming as certain other materialistic theory about sentience. For example, suppose sentience is inevitable if certain logical functions are performed; certain type of information processing. To be inevitable, and at the same time useful, an individual with more sentience should have an advantage over another individual with less sentience.
In a physical world in which evolution describes at a high level the behavior of matter that follows the laws of classical physics, if sentience were a consequence of classical physics, sentience could not be an evolutionarily differential aspect. Everything evolutionarily differential would be perfectly described by such classical physics. Sentience would be physically inevitable, not evolutionarily useful.
If, however, we insist that sentience can be an evolutionarily differential aspect, then the acquisition of such sentience must incorporate some component that goes beyond the laws of the physical world in which evolution arises.
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