Hypothesis 1
Emergentist monism and epiphenomenalism consider that there is only one “strong” reality: matter (materialism) or the reality represented by the laws of physics (physicalism), the understanding of which is sufficient to explain everything that happens.
Under this interpretation of reality, the world of subjective experiences, such as pleasure and pain, is a consequence of that single material or physical reality. The world of experiences would be nothing more than a by-product, an epiphenomenon, something “negligible.”
Under these paradigms, the “strong” existence of concepts such as “soul,” “spirit,” “identity,” or “free will” is rejected. It is accepted that such things happen, but they are recognized as having a “weak” existence, since they are simply a consequence of material (or physical) reality. And since material (or physical) reality is sufficient to explain everything that exists (including subjective experiences), it is assumed that realities that are “weak” (such as subjective experiences) do not, in turn, have a real influence on the material or physical world.
This metaphysical interpretation is very common among scientists and, to a certain extent, among people in general.
The alternative known as non-materialist physicalism is remarkable, which assumes sentience as another component of physics; a natural component, but not a material one.
Hypothesis 2
On the other hand, many people, including scientists, share the opinion that motivation plays a role in evolution. They think that experiences of pain and pleasure represent alerts and motivation mechanisms that are oriented towards the survival of the individual and the species. For example, fear (in response to certain stimuli, such as the appearance of a predator) makes the heart beat faster, and the heart beating faster (in response to certain stimuli) is beneficial for the survival of the individual and the species (in reality, it is about the survival of the genes that encode this behavior). That is, fear is useful, evolutionarily speaking, because it motivates one to do the right thing, from an evolutionary point of view.
Synthesis
Both hypotheses are contradictory. And many scientists and individuals hold both.
Why?
Answer 1
One possible explanation is that there is no such contradiction, and that there is some error in this exposition. The creation of new and better tools for the representation and communication of these ideas would be of great help in detecting such an error or errors.
Answer 2
Another possible explanation is that people who hold both beliefs are not aware of the contradiction, given the complexity of these ideas. If new and better tools were available to look at this whole thing more clearly, this would make it easier for these people to revise and update their belief system, and the advancement of metaphysics.
Answer 3
Another possible explanation is that when people say that fear makes the heart beat faster, they are speaking metaphorically or simply summarizing, giving a high-level description, and that what they really meant was that it is the biochemical secretions of the brain and nervous system (such as adrenaline) —and not the subjective experience of fear— that increase the heartbeat.
If we accept this last case and therefore accept that subjective experiences, by themselves, play no role in evolution, then why do they exist? Are they inevitable when certain conditions are met? And what are those conditions?
At first glance, it seems that these conditions have nothing to do with the wet, carbon-based nature of natural neurons, and that all of this could happen to robots or within computer simulations in which agents evolve.
On the other hand, if we were to continue to insist on the idea that natural neurons may have something special that artificial ones do not have, and that sentience could still be useful in its own right, then it seems that sentience should incorporate some element that goes beyond classical physics. For example, related to quantum physics or the multiverse. This article explores this possibility, but there may be many other ramifications and variants that try to resolve this contradiction.
In the resolution of this contradiction it seems that there may be some key to understanding under what conditions the ability to feel occurs. If we were able to delve into this contradiction and resolve it, we would be much closer to determining whether machines, such as robots or simulations, are capable of feeling and under what conditions; or whether very simple individuals such as insects are capable of feeling and to what extent. The impact of greater confidence in these considerations would be immense. Not only would it open our minds to a world that was almost inconceivable before, but it would also be a fundamental element in promoting the well-being of these beings (robots, simulations, insects, etc.) and their happiness.
What would be the interpretation of non-materialist physicalism?
As I understand non-materialist physicalism, we can forget about the problems of dualism and emergentism / epiphenomenalism and simply consider all reality as something unified (a kind of monism) that includes both the material and sentience. Metaphorically we could explain it as if there were two types of particles: the material ones and others that include the capacity to feel. But they would not be two worlds, but one. In this framework, the Binding Problem would remain to be clarified: “If the phenomenal unity of mind is an effectively classical phenomenon, then I have no idea how to derive the properties of our phenomenally bound minds from decohered, effectively classical neurons”. Digital sentience would be impossible because “digital computing depends on effectively classical, decohered individual bits of information”. (See references at the end of this conversation). I interpret these statements I have cited to mean that under the monism of non-materialist physicalism, subjective experiences cannot have a foundation based on classical physics; they need something else. This is consistent with the ideas I have developed above. But I do not see that the “Binding problem” is really a problem. Of course, it will be a problem for digital minds, but not for wet, quantum beings.
Written 6/10/2020. Reviewed 23/9/2024 including references to non-materialist physicalism..
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