Universal Basic Income (UBI) can be implemented without taxation by Quantitative Easing, but instead of the conventional way of QE (central bank’s purchase of bonds with new currency), by giving all people in the country QE-based UBI.

You can see the number of animals killed per person per year in different regions of the world at The Veganalyser (https://www.vegansociety.com/sites/default/apps/veganalyser/) of The Vegan Society. This is the most sophisticated veg*an calculator I have seen.

When you choose the second option (Already vegan?) and choose the region, and put years (1 year, or 100 years if you want a more accurate number), you can see the number of animals consumed per person per year by different species of animals.

For example, South Asia contributes to the death of 105.58 animals per person per year. 100.41 were fish. While Northern America responsible for the death of 47.85 animals per person per year. The consumption in East, Mid, West Africa were 15-17 animals per person per year. (Southern or Northen Africa are higher) Most animals consumed in those Africa regions are fish as well.

Of course, there are limitations to this calculator. For example, all Asian regions were estimated to slaughter 100.41 fishes per person per year, all African regions 12 fish/person/year. For information on the calculator, see https://www.vegansociety.com/whats-new/campaigns/veganalyser/about-veganalyser

Nonetheless, 100 fish/person/year in Asia estimate does not seems to be overestimated. According to the fishcount.org.uk, 0.97-2.7 trillion wild fishes are slaughtered every year. That is 130 fish/person/year.

Conclusion: The concerns of meat eater problem is not ‘negligible’ in developing countries. As about 50% of fish are farmed (http://www.livescience.com/5682-milestone-50-percent-fish-farmed.html), the suffering farmed fish will endure during the course of its life should be taken into account as well.

Also posted at the Facebook The Poor Meat Eater Debate group.

Note: The order of books listed here may not reflect the significance of that book to the development of my view. Listing of books here do not equal endorsement. For some of books, I may not have read cover-to-cover.

Effective Altruism: Doing Good Better (William MacAskill) The Most Good You Can Do (Peter Singer)

Cognitive Science: Blank Slate (Steven Pinker) Free Will (Sam Harris) Smarter (Dan Hurley)

Philosophy: Straw Dogs (John Gray) Life, Death and Meaning (David Benatar, ed.) The Human Predicament (Benatar) Against Moral Responsibility (Bruce Waller)

Population Ethics: Reasons and Persons (Derek Parfit, the book is not exclusively on population ethics) Better Never to Have Been (Benatar) Debating Procreation (Benatar, et al.)

Animal Ethics: Why We Love Dogs, Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows (Melanie Joy) Eternal Treblinka (Charles Patterson) Animal Liberation (Singer)

Singularity: The Singularity Is Near (Ray Kurzweil) Superintelligence (Nick Bostrom) Engines of Creation (K. Eric Drexler)

Poverty: Out of Poverty (Paul Polak) The Business Solution to Poverty (Polak) 100 under $100 (Betsy Teutsch)

Other: One Person Acted and Everything Changed (Deborah Rohan et al.) 2 Billion under 20 (Stacey Ferreira et al.)

Even if you are not “antinatalist”, what do you think about what I wanna call a “reducenatalism” (REE-dyoo-see-nay-tuhl-izm)?

Reducenatalism, like reducetarianism, seeks to reduce the number of children one will have. One does not need to be childfree/childless or antinatalist to be a reducenatalist. One needs only reduce the number of children one will have to below certain point. (e.g. below the fertility rate of your country) That would mean 0-1 child in rich countries, 0-2 child in developing countries, or any number below the fertility rate of your country.

Environmental or overpopulation reasons for having only one child was defended by Sarah Conly at the book One Child (OUP, https://global.oup.com/academic/product/one-child-9780190203436)

One of the excellant non-overpopulation reasons for the reducenatalism is that the amount of resources you can provide for your child per capita is divided “1/n” when you have 2nd or subsequent children. Consequently, when you are having 2nd or subsequent children, you are effectively “harming” developmental/educational prospects or even health prospects of your earlier/existing child(ren). If you have only one child and relatively well-off, you might be able to afford to send your child to private schools, hire a tutor, travel foreign countries with your child, buy (a lot of) books for him/her, send s/he to study abroad, send s/he to college and/or graduate school. Even in rich countries, there is a life expectancy difference between socioeconomic strata. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2017/01/31/low-socioeconomic-status-affects-life-expectancy-more-than-obesi_a_21704449/)

However, it seems most parents who have 2nd or subsequent child do rarely, if ever, think about the “1/n” effects of having another child. Of course, a child’s younger sibling(s) can provide some emotional benefits to the child, and the emotional or other benefits to the adult s/he will become. However, it is also true not just financial resources, but one’s time and attention to the child will also be divided as “1/n” when one has 2 or more child.

Contents warning: Reading this text could be very prejudicial to mental health, including but not limited to panic attack.

I think much s-risk research is focused on the possibility of non-human animals or computer (simulation) suffering in the future. However, it is entirely possible currently existing people (you, I, and our family and friends), or your possible offspring could suffer astronomically (extremely intensely (e.g., immolation) and/or for very long time (e.g. trillions of years)) in the future, by AI or human-controlled AI.

It seems possible that current humans, if their lifespan expanded radically by the molecular assembler or other technologies, could suffer many billions/trillions of years, possibly with physical pain and mental suffering of the greatest intensity a sentient being could experience. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphical_timeline_from_Big_Bang_to_Heat_Death)

While strict utilitarians would care themselves and insects equally, most people care about themselves, their offspring and their family the most. I think s-risk advocacy should consider awakening people that they themselves and their children, family and friends could suffer more than trillion years.

Although the potential children you could have now will not suffer s-risk if you choose not to have them, actually future AI could harvest your genetic material or information to create your genetic offspring to torture them billion/trillions of years.

Sadistic AI or sadist-controlled AI caused astronomical future suffering could be the worst in all three dimensions of suffering-focused three-dimensional population ethics, P (People): the number of victims, I (Intensity): the intensity of suffering, and D (Duration): the duration each victim suffers. For example, for P, our universe is said to have resources to contain 5*10^46 humans. (p. 8, http://www.jetpress.org/volume12/CosmologicalForecast.pdf) For I, the intensity could range from solitary confinement to immolation. For D, the duration could range from one billion to many trillions of years per each sentient being.

It seems plausible to think, unlike extinction risk, suffering risk could have different badness among its suffering scenarios. For example, pronatalism-caused astronomical future suffering (AFS) and sadism-caused astronomical future suffering would arguably have similar suffering-years, as maximum possible P*D is ultimately determined by resource constraints of the universe. There is no intrinsic reason to think high-intensity suffering computation would need much more resources than low-intensity suffering computation. However, sadism-caused AFS could be much worse than pronatalism-caused AFS in the I (intensity) dimension. Even if sadism-caused s-risk is 10^3 times less likely than pronatalism-caused s-risk, it also seems plausible sadism-caused AFS could be more than 10^3 times worse than pronatalism-caused AFS in the dimension of I, or the total suffering (P*I*D). If it is true that (pronatalism-caused s-risk) / (sadism-caused s-risk) < (the amount of suffering of sadism-caused AFS) / (the amount of suffering of pronatalism-caused AFS), it seems there is some reason to also focus on sadism-caused s-risks, unless focusing on sadism-caused s-risk is not effective or even prejudicial for (expected) suffering reduction. Although I think (1) awakening people that they themselves and their children/family/friends could be victim of s-risks; (2) awakening people that sadism, not just pronatalism, could be a cause of s-risks; could raise awareness on s-risks issues, I think perhaps there is more information hazard risk of sadism-caused s-risk research/advocacy than pronatalism-caused s-risk research/advocacy. So I am not sure whether this post will have positive NU-EV, nor am I sure it could have more than 50% chance of positive NU-EV (possibly 60-65%? http://reducing-suffering.org/summary-beliefs-values-big-questions/#link_ajs-fn-id_1-2255). What do you think about (1) the advocacy value of awakening people that they themselves and their children/family/friends could suffer AFS, possibly for billion/trillions of years; (2) whether sadism-caused s-risk is, for its probability or its badness, an important concern or cause area; (3) possible information hazards of sadism-caused s-risk.

Anthropogenic non-human suffering

e.g., animal farming, harvesting

Example organizations:
Most Animal Charity Evaluators Charities

Anthropogenic human suffering

e.g., violence on human (human rights violation)

Example organizations:
Amnesty International

Non-anthropogenic non-human suffering

e.g., wild animal suffering

Example organizations:
Some organizations recognize wild animal suffering (e.g. Animal Ethics)\

Non-anthropogenic human suffering

e.g., disease, natural disaster

Example organizations:
Give Well recommended charities

(domesticated) Animal Years (AY) per year, or simply (domesticated) animal population is a metric to estimate the amount of suffering caused by humans due to use of animals.

It is notable that about 97% of animal years caused by humans for food are attributable to honey.

It is quite surprising, that even before entomophagy (eating insect) becoming worldwide practice, the overwhelming majority of animal life-years caused by humans are attributable to insects (honey bees).

This table does not include farmed marine animals, or for example, silkworms, cochineals, lac bugs, lab animals.

For the quality of life of insects including honey bees see, for example, “How Good or Bad Is the Life of an Insect?” (Simon Knutsson, http://www.simonknutsson.com/how-good-or-bad-is-the-life-of-an-insect)

Note:
Data other than honey bees: FAOSTAT, Live Animals, World, Stocks, 2014 (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QA)
“Animals live nes”: “Any other animal grown for meat, eggs, feathers and skins, e.g. ostrich, antelope, deer, reindeer, chamois.”

Data for honey bees:
FAOSTAT, Livestock Primary, World, Production Quantity, Honey, natural, 2014 (http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL) : 1,510,566 tonnes

“How much honey does the average worker honey bee make in her lifetime? – 1/12 teaspoon.” (https://www.honey.com/newsroom/press-kits/honey-trivia)

Density of Honey: 1.36 kg/l (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honey#Nutritional_and_sugar_profile)

Estimated average lifespan of honey bees: 4 months (25-35 days summer, 6-8 months winter)
(Amdam, Gro Vang, and Stig W. Omholt. “The regulatory anatomy of honeybee lifespan.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 216.2 (2002): 209.)

A shock collar is a device that is used on non-human animals, which delivers electric shocks on the animal, for animal containment, bark control or training.

While I oppose the usage of shock collars on non-human animals, I think that it is possible that we can combine ‘taser’-like electric shock device and ankle monitor (GPS), in order to eliminate/reduce incarceration by replacing it with a house arrest.

Non-violent offenders or low-risk violent offenders may be allowed to go out of the house during permitted hours in the permitted place to engage in permitted activities. Permitted activities could include employment, education, religious activities, or even certain approved family activities or socialization.

However, if offenders go outside the boundaries, GPS will detect it, and audio or vibration warning will be delivered. If offenders continue to breach the terms of house arrest after automatic warning, an electric shock will be delivered, incapacitating muscles from moving (think about Taser), enforcing the terms of house arrest by effectively preventing them from going out of the boundaries. Of course, probation services will be automatically notified of the breach of the terms of probation, such as breaching geological boundaries or tampering with or refusing to charge the device.

It may sound very Orwellian, but I think it is much better than prison. Also, the fact that the device contains automatic electric shock delivery system will allay the concern of the general public on abolishing incarceration, or reducing incarceration significantly.

See also:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prison_abolition_movement
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shock_collar
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ankle_monitor
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taser

Procreative benevolence-malevolence asymmetry: While you cannot bring someone into existence to reduce their suffering (as the potential person was not suffering at all while non-existent), you can create someone to inflict suffering upon.

<Conundrum of negative population ethics>

World A: 1 person suffers 1 billion seconds
World B: 1 billion people suffer 1 second each with the same intensity per second

World B strikes me as much less bad than World A.

World C: 1 billion people suffer 2 seconds each with the same intensity per second

World C strikes me as quite less bad than World A.

…

World Z: 1 billion people suffer 1 billion minus 1 seconds each with the same intensity per second

Can we say World Z is less bad than World A? How can we calculate the disvalue of the world? Distributional consideration should be taken into account or not?

S-risks, Suffering-focused ethics, Innovation, Freedom, Sovereignty diversity, Special Economic Zone, startup society, Cognitive Liberty, Child abuse/neglect/rights, child corporal punishment reduction/abolition, male circumcision (MGM), FGM, human rights, molecular assembler, artificial intelligence, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, CRISPIR, gene drives, abolitionism, blockchain, cryptocurrency, universal basic income, global basic income, global or universal basic income on blockchain, education, english as second/foreign language education, machine translation, programming education, computer-based education, freedom of movement/open border/immigration, rights of expatriation and secession, criminal justice reform, judicial corporal punishment, suicide, electronic tagging, amputation, sterilisation and castration as alternatives of imprisonment, human life extension and transhumanism, castration as a way of human life extension, medical libido control, human willpower (disciplinedness) engineering, rationality, micronutrients difficiency, algae as food, meal replacements, conveyor belt or tube based catered apartment or residence, animal welfare/rights, mental health, right to die, family planning, anti-natalism, pro-mortalism, negative utilitarianism, seasteading (two-dimensional surface-floating interconnectable, triangle, rectangle, hexagonal), new country projects (terra nullius: Bir Tawil, Mary Bird Lands, International Water, Arctic Sea, moon, the Mars, outer space, etc.), individual/regional/national self-determination, migration of humans to international water, antarctica, arctic, outer space, moon, the Mars, atmosphere (airship). personal rapid transit. (vacuum) tube train. personal mobility device. velomobile. copyright reform/abolition. patent reform/abolition. universal library. alternative compensation system. artistic freedom voucher. nootropics. cognitive enhancement. tDCS/tES/tACS/tRNS/TNS/DBS. Airship (particularly steam as a lifting gas). Submersive seasteading (three-dimensional interconnectable, cuboid). ocean thermal energy conversion. safe and inexpensive nuclear reactors. flying lavatories (so that you can call lavatory whenever you want if you go outside your house, to provide a dignified, private and hygienic relief). robotic reduction of sexual, romantic and social frustration. electronic monitoring/tagging of convicts, possibly combined with ‘taser’. electronic crime prevention. drone-based policing (possibly combined with ‘taser’). drone-based political activism (sending drone camera to factory farms, for example). international power politics in the era of superintelligence. interplanetary power politics. brain-computer interface. entrepreneurship education. futurology. human intelligence enhancement. the heritability of intelligence. the possible difference of the average, the median and the distribtion of intelligence among gender, ethnic groups, social class, profession, college major, etc. and its implications to human society, on equality and affirmative action in particular. a theory on human intelligence. percentile-based intelligence, rather than average 100, standard deviation 15, which is based on ‘bell curve’ (the normal distribution) assumption. lexiconal assessment of human intelligence. Korean alphabet-based English Language Spelling Reform (it is too many, for more information on some of these topics, jiwoonhwang.org)

Summary: Although more test, research, cost-effectiveness verification is needed, providing two helmets (one for driver, one for passenger) for motorcycle taxi drivers of developing countries to reduce traffic accident fatality could have around $10/QALY, $350/life-saved-equivalent(35 QALY) cost-effectiveness.

What’s your thoughts on giving two helmets (one for driver, one for passenger) for motorcycle taxi drivers of developing countries to reduce traffic accident fatality? It is estimated that traffic accident take 1.25 million lives a year, which is comparable to malaria.

Initially published on Facebook Effective Altruism group.

I recently found out that eyeglasses is perhaps the most neglected cause in the world. (See the image, Glasses: $0.016/person/year, Malaria: $11.22/person/year, i.e. 700 times difference of Global Funding per person per year, of course per capita cost/importance of malaria may be bigger), WEF report, “Eyeglasses for Global Development: Bridging the Visual Divide”, June 2016, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_2016_EYElliance.pdf, p. 14)

“2.5 billion people live with poor vision unnecessarily because they need yet do not have eyeglasses.” “The global economy loses $227 billion every year from
lost productivity among adults who need eyeglasses.” (Ibid., p. 7)

One of cheap cost per pair supplier quotes $0.145 per pair at MOQ 30,000. (https://goo.gl/Xa5Icv, Disclosure: I’m not affiliated with the supplier and have no financial interests in the company, When I contacted the supplier, they said they can provide minus diopter spectacles (for myopia) as well, and PD (pupillary distance) can also be customized)

Of course, the concern is the safety or practicality of providing RMS instead of custom or ready-to-assemble spectacles. (see the second image) There are researches on practicality of providing RMS for people in the developing countries. (https://goo.gl/jADGHU) One research on Indian Adults concluded that “While vision is slightly better with CS (custom spectacles), 90% of an adult population with URE (uncorrected refractive error) planned to continue to use their RMS at 1 month. Furthermore, if those without high astigmatism or anisometropia are excluded, virtually all are satisfied with RMS and there is no difference when compared with CS. The findings of this study support the use of RMS for the delivery of refractive services in settings where there is a high level of need, limited resources and low access to refractive services.” (Keay, Lisa, et al. “A randomized clinical trial to evaluate ready-made spectacles in an adult population in India.” International journal of epidemiology (2010): dyp384., p. 1., https://goo.gl/8Ov5zL) (acronym definitions added)

In aforementioned research, they used 25 kinds of RMS lens powers (“+1.00 to +4.00 in 0.50 steps, +5.00, +6.00 and +8.00, -1.00 to -6.00 in 0.50 steps, – 7.00, -8.00, -9.00 and -10.00 and had the same power in each eye in order to mimic a limited inventory of 25 stock keeping units” with optical center distance of 60mm, Ibid., p. 3)

Almost all RMSes found in developed or developing country + (plus) Diopter-ed glasses. That is to say, almost all readymade glasses so far has been intended as a reading glasses for presbyopia. ISO 16034:2002 (https://goo.gl/vamtod), explicitly stipulated lens power range of RMS as within +1.00 Diopter to +3.50 Diopters

Of course, I think we have to ensure Readymade Glasses from mainland China are of acceptable quality. (one of such quality standard is, obviously, ISO 16034:2002, although I don’t think we have to comply with its requirement the power range of the RMS should be +1.00D to +3.50D)

I think one distinctive merit of RMS, along with its very cheap cost, is that because RMS can be easily displayed on store, and people can try RMS by themselves. By this way, we could avoid the need to train optometrist/optician and regulations pertaining to eye examination and glasses prescription and dispensing.

Peter Singer compares(https://youtu.be/Diuv3XZQXyc?t=11m45s) treating trachoma (USD 20-50) and providing service dog (USD 40,000). Of course, untreated trachoma may make the person completely blind, while glasses improves the visual acuity of people with low visual acuity (i.e. non-completely blinded) with naked eye. But the price per glasses (USD 0.145, USD 0.2-2? incl. shipping and delivery) seems to be much cheaper than treating trachoma. Also, 80 million people are affected by trachoma (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trachoma), while 2.5 billion people affected by uncorrected refractive error. If we assume providing RMS cost $0.2-0.5 (incl. shipping and delivery) and treating trachoma cost $20-50, providing RMS is about 100 times cheaper.

I’m not sure how the impact of providing Readymade Spectacles compares with deworming or malaria, but considering the overwhelming majority RMSes found on devloped/developing country stores are + Diopter-ed RMSes, selling, not necessarily donating, – Diopter-ed RMSes through developing country stores may have significant impact.

Originally published in Facebook Effective Altruism Group

Summary: A referendum to fund official development assistance or effective aid might be very effective way to increase ODA/EA funding, potentially moving billions of dolllars a year to ODA/EA.

Derek Parfit suggested a referendum to dedicate government revenue to ‘effective aid agencies’ as a potential way to increase EA funding.

“If we could get a referendum, in which all rich people will be taxed and that will be given to effective aid agencies there are many people who wouldn’t give it on their own, but who vote for the referendum, because if it was gonna affect a million other people, then they don’t need to give the same amount as part of the package a million times as much good.” -Derek Parfit (https://youtu.be/xTUrwO9-B_I?t=37m48s)

The country with the most referendum-based direct democracy is, obviously, Switzerland. ODA/GNI ratio of Switzerland is 0.52%, giving $3.54 billion/year. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_development_aid_country_donors) If the federal popular initiative to increase ODA/GNI ratio of Switzerland to 1% was initiated by 100,000 signatures, and pass the referendum, Switzerland may increase ODA/year by $3.27 billion, which is about 30 times of $100million/year of GiveWell-moved donations. (also it is an estimated amount of annual EA-motivated donation)

Granted, conventional ODAs might be said to be ineffective, or less effective than EA-charities. In that case, the referendum can prescribe certain EA-charities to fund. For example, the referendum may prescribe rather than the increase ODA/GNI ratio, but the dedication of ODA budgets to ‘effective aid agencies’. Instead of GiveWell, the referendum may prescribe the establishment of a government agency to verify the effectiveness of various charities or causes.

Along with Switzerland, other countries may also be a feasible candidate for referendum or lobbying to increase ODA/EA budget. For example, countries with relatively high ODA/GNI ratio (Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK have ODA/GNI ratio above 0.7%), or liberal U.S. states. (e.g. California Proposition initiative)

Brian Tomasik​ suggested tax earmarking by direct democracy may increase foreign aid budget. (http://briantomasik.com/taxes-earmarked/) Along with the referendum to increase ODA/EA budget, I think tax earmarking can also be very good way to increase ODA/EA budget.

originally published on Facebook group ‘Effective Altruism’ (https://www.facebook.com/groups/effective.altruists/permalink/1330726516983702/)

A survey found that people value human suffering 11,500 times more than non-human animal suffering.

“Survey responses reveal that people are willing to allow up to 11,500 farm animals to suffer if the suffering of one human could be eliminated.” (p. 11)

(Lusk, Jayson L., F. Bailey Norwood, and Robert W. Prickett. “Consumer preferences for farm animal welfare: Results of a nationwide telephone survey.” Oklahoma State University, Department of Agricultural Economics (2007). http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.514.9416&rep=rep1&type=pdf)

The Question

Do you agree with the following statement?
If a new technology were created that could either eliminate the suffering of 1 human or the suffering of X farm animals, it should be used to eliminate the suffering of the 1 human. (Ibid. p. 10)

It seems SCI (Schistosomiasis Control Initiative) could be also effective in preventing HIV/AIDS, because “between 20 million and 150 million” girls and women in sub-Saharan Africa suffer female genital schistosomiasis (FGS), which affects “33% and 75% of girls and women with S. [Schistosoma] haematobium”, and “FGS is associated with a 3-4 fold increase in acquiring HIV/AIDS during sexual intercourse”.

I’m not sure why GiveWell or SCI didn’t take into account HIV/AIDS prevention as a benefit of schistosomiasis reduction. More research is needed on the cost-effectiveness of SCI to reduce HIV/AIDS, but if HIV/AIDS prevention was taken into account as an impact of SCI, perhaps SCI might be the most effective health intervention?

If FGS affects 1% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa (100 million/1 billion), FGS increases one’s likeliness to get HIV infection by 10%p (HIV prevalence of sub-Saharan Africa is 4.9%, http://files.unaids.org/en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/epidemiology/2012/gr2012/20121120_UNAIDS_Global_Report_2012_with_annexes_en.pdf), 1000 schistosomiasis treatment averts 1 HIV infection? (if $0.50 is needed for 1 schistosomiasis treatment, 1 HIV infection lead to 0.5 death, that would mean $1000/life-saved?)

Relevant links: (non-exhaustive)
http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2013/05/06/female-genital-schistosomiasis-fgs-sub-saharan-africas-secret-scourge-of-girls-and-women/ (source of the quotations)
http://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0000430
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-hotez-md-phd/womens-health-africa_b_1412350.html
http://journals.lww.com/aidsonline/Abstract/2006/02280/Association_between_genital_schistosomiasis_and.13.aspx
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/095646249400500517
http://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0001396
http://journals.lww.com/co-hivandaids/Abstract/2012/05000/The_effects_of_schistosomiasis_on_HIV_AIDS.9.aspx

At the World Bank’s PovcalNet, you can see how many people are in poverty below certain poverty levels.

Clearly, most people under $1/day are in sub-Saharan Africa. 143.86 million people out of 173.95 million people under $1/day were in Africa. (2013, PovcalNet, op. cit. henceforth)

If you set the poverty line at $2/day, 413.37 million out of 861.23 million people under $2/day were from sub-Saharan Africa, which means more than 50% of people under $2/day are outside sub-Saharan Africa.

If you set the poverty line at $3/day, South Asia has more people under $3/day than sub-Saharan Africa, 812.03 and 602.18 million, respectively.

If you set the poverty line at $5/day, more than 75% of poverty under $5/day is outside sub-Saharan Africa. Out of 3,208.70 million people under $5/day, sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 782.08 million people.

What does this fact mean? Our attention to African poverty is warranted as most people under $1/day are in Africa. The most serious absolute poverty are mostly in Africa. However, it is noteworthy that more than half of the people under $2/day are in fact outside sub-Saharan Africa.

One merit of tDCS is that its per treatment (session/tablet) price is much cheaper than antidepressants or consultation. Although saline solution might be needed for tDCS usage, 9V battery and sponges/electrodes will need replacements only occasionally.

Another merit of tDCS is that one device can be shared, as one treatment session is typically only 20 minutes (in the case of 2mA).

What do you think about adopting for-profit type of organizational structure or incentive system in charities?

For example, I think new, experimental, startup charities are very under-created partly because there is no financial incentive to fund seed/early stage charities.

I think it might be possible to compensate seed/early stage funders of charities with the x% of donations thereafter.

“the average person on Earth prevents ~1.4 * 10^7 insect-years by his/her environmental impact each year.” (Brian Tomasik, http://reducing-suffering.org/humanitys-net-impact-on-wild-animal-suffering/)

“Seemingly benign bovines and other livestock eat soybeans from the deforested tropics, emit clouds of methane, pollute streams and gobble up 30 percent of the world’s grain production.” (http://www.smithsonianmag.com/travel/is-the-livestock-industry-destroying-the-planet-11308007/)

If livestock industry is accountable for 30% of human environmental impact, each meat-eater may reduce ~4 * 10^6 more insect-years per year.

Average humans (directly) cause ~1.3*10^2 animal years (AY) per year for the livestock industry. (~0.9 trillion AY/world/year) incl. honey bees, excl. farmed fish, http://jiwoonhwang.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/animal-years.jpg)

For farmed fish, up to 128 billion farmed fish are estimated to be slaughtered. (http://fishcount.org.uk/fish-count-estimates#farmedestimate) If they live for 2 years (http://reducing-suffering.org/how-much-direct-suffering-is-caused-by-various-animal-foods/#Results), up to 0.25 trillion AY/world/year will be caused to farmed fish.

I.e. AY/person/year one meat-eater causes will be around ~1.6 * 10^2. If each meat-eater indeed reduces AY by ~4 * 10^6/person/year, one meat eater reduces ~2.5 * 10^4 times more wild animal suffering as s/he causes on farmed animals?

There is uncertainty on whether 43% additional crop cultivation due to livestock industry will indeed cause 43% additional reduction of wild-animal population. See also http://reducing-suffering.org/vegetarianism-and-wild-animals/.

Note: I am not sure that animal industry really do reduce wild animal population, and there are good deontological reasons for veg*anism as well, even if it may increase the wild animal population.

Recently, I had an email correspondence with World Vasectomy Day​ (worldvasectomyday.org), a charity that provides vasectomies in developing countries which was featured in the documentary movie The Vasectomist​ (https://www.netflix.com/title/80101980). They stated they spend ~$17/vasectomy. Of course, more verification on the number and room for more funding etc., are needed.

AMF averts under 5 death for $9409/child. (https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1KiWfiAGX_QZhRbC9xkzf3I8IqsXC5kkr-nwY_feVlcM/edit#gid=115155829) Even if one vasectomy reduces only one birth, for the money you can “save” an under 5 child, you can avert 500 births. While it is difficult to directly compare the impact of fertility reduction and child mortality reduction, wild-animal suffering concerns aside, it seems 500 vasectomies would be much more high impact than saving one child under age 5.

Note: World Vasectomy Day Facebook page shared my post in FB group Effective Family Planning Charities (https://www.facebook.com/WorldVasDay/posts/1563424363732995)

—
My reply to a comment by T. R. Kirk in the thread:

I copy an e-mail response to my inquiry from urologist Dr Douglas Stine, Director of Development, NSVI and Co-Founder, WVD, with his permission.

“No-Scalpel Vasectomy International (NSVI) is a not-for-profit organization incorporated in 2002 in Pennsylvania. NSVI (1) provides vasectomy services and training in developing countries through missions of volunteer foreign doctors, and (2) financially and materially supports domestic teams of vasectomy providers in those countries between our missions.

World Vasectomy Day (WVD) is a not-for-profit organization incorporated in 2015 in New York. WVD (1) celebrates men who have chosen to play a role in family planning through vasectomy, and thereby (2) encourages other men to do likewise; (3) supports and appreciates doctors who provide vasectomy services; and (4) encourages governments and other family planning organizations to embrace vasectomy by supporting the doctors who provide it and enhancing the availability of vasectomy in the regions that they govern and serve.

The two organizations are complementary: WVD provides a framework to enhance acceptance and provision of vasectomy worldwide, and NSVI is a provider of vasectomy services and training in a few countries where we have been invited. Its programs in those countries serve as models that can be adopted by other countries challenged by population growth that outpaces infrastructure development.

The amount that NSVI pays our Domestic Teams in the Philippines, Kenya, and Haiti varies with exchange rates, but it is currently $60 in the Philippines, $66 in Kenya, and $45 in Haiti. How the money is allocated each team member is explained in the respective Domestic Team pages in www.NSVI.org. Nearly all money donated to NSVI goes to provision of services. Our Board is not paid. I think that our only administrative cost is what we pay our accountant to keep our records and file our tax return. Our donors are listed at https://www.nsvi.org/thanks-to-donors/.”

Do you think (1) in the negative total utilitarian population ethics/axiology; (2) act-utilitarian, rather than rule-utilitarian normative ethics; (3) taking all sufferings that will be borne by all sentient beings from now to 10^1000 years rather, predicted heat death of the universe;, that we can predict what courses of action will have above-0 EV?

For example, definitely, some courses of action will reduce suffering, or at least above-0 EV in NU view, in probabilistic determinism view.

However, can we really predict what courses of action will reduce suffering, or above-zero EV in NU view in the quantum-probabilistic deterministic world? (of course, taking all suffering until the heat death into account)

For example, it has been said that the fund managers on average, are no better than monkeys in the investment performance. There are definitely above-average fund managers, but it seems most are not statistically significant. (of course, 5% will have p<0.05, but you can get p<0.05 – 5% with monkey fund managers as well) (Of course, there have been a few fund managers seems to have p<10^-10, possibly including Warren Buffet) Brian Tomasik, arguably the most sophisticated suffering-focused researcher of our time, puts EV of FRI as 200 (+/- 400). While I think there is nothing else we can do, I am more sceptic that we can predict any courses of action could have above-zero EV. That is not to say that no course of action has above-zero EV, but perhaps we might be no better than monkeys in picking courses of action that have above-zero EV. For example, one of scenarios of s-risk research backfire is that s-risk research might have some information hazards. It could motivate suffering-focused altruist and sadists simultaneously. It could motivate negative utilitarians (NUs, agents focused on minimising suffering) and positive disutilitarians (PDUs, agents focused on maximising suffering) simultaneously. While I hope there are more NUs than PDUs, it seems politics often favors Machiavelic agents over altruistic agents for the position of power, while most Machiavelic agents might be just selfish rather than PDU. (I used ‘Machiavelic’ in a sense of ethics-blindedness, rather than in a sense of non-deontological political strategy) I am definitely not saying doing nothing is better than doing something. I think while doing some courses of action have above-zero EV, and doing some courses of action have below-zero EV, we might not be able to pick above-zero EV course of action any better than monkeys. For this reason, EV of doing something as whole could have the same EV as doing nothing. It should be noted that epistemic EV and quantum EV are quite different. The fact that you think EV is above-zero does not make actual EV above-zero. Note 1: This post is for discussion/question purpose only, and clearly not intended to dissuade anyone from donating to FRI/MIRI nor intended to dissuade from trying to reduce s-risks, nor intended to dissuade from trying to reduce suffering in the world. I am writing this post as a question, or to start a discussion, I will be very glad if you could change my view! (I opted for public conversation, rather than possibly emailing Brian, see http://reducing-suffering.org/why-i-prefer-public-conversations/, also I suppose this question could be in mind of people other than me, as I have seen similar question on Reddit, which was linked below (this post is not strictly public as this group is a closed group)) Note 2: It might be possible that suffering-reduction efforts focused on human or nonhuman suffering there will during several coming decades on the planet have positive EV, without negative EV backfire in the far future. Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graphical_timeline_from_Big_Bang_to_Heat_Death http://reducing-suffering.org/donation-recommendations/#Rankings See also: https://www.reddit.com/r/EffectiveAltruism/comments/61nkw1/why_bother/

According to Table 1 (p. 108) of Schrauzer et al. (1990, https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Lithium+in+drinking+water+and+the+incidences+of+crimes%2C+suicides%2C+and+arrests+related+to+drug+addictions&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5), There was no statistically significant difference between low-Lithium (0-12 mcg Li/L) counties and medium-Lithium (13-60 mcg Li/L) counties of Texas in suicide rates (14.2, 14.8 per 100,000 person-year, respectively). However, there were statistically significant lower suicide rates in high-Lithium counties (8.7 per 100,000 person-year) compared to medium/low-Lithium counties (14.8, 14.2 per 100,000 person-year, respectively, p<0.005, p<0.01, respectively). This suggests that on drinking water Lithium levels lower than 60 mcg Li/L, the suicide rate may not decrease with the increase of lithium level. However, on lithium levels higher than 70 mcg Li/L, suicide rate decreased dramatically, by 42%. Also, it is notable that homicide, rape, and robbery were decreased more than 50% in high Lithium counties (Group A) compared to low Lithium counties (Group C). This suggests lithium in drinking water may be effective not just in reducing suicide, depression and mental illness, but in reducing violence, crime, and incarceration.

Although Knudsen et al. (2017, http://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/14/6/627/htm) found no correlation between lithium level in water and suicide rates, it may well be due to very low maximum lithium level (30.7 mcg Li/L) of samples of Knudsen et al. (2017). 30.7 mcg Li/L will be considered as a medium-Lithium level (13-60 mcg Li/L), not high-Lithium (70-160 mcg Li/L) in the study of Schrauzer et al. (1990).

Cost effectiveness ballpark estimate of tap water lithiation

(Cost per intentional death averted)
= 100,000 / (Intentional death (homicide + suicide) per 100,000 person-year) * (Required lithium per person-year) * (price per lithium)
= 100,000 / (13.4 + 14.8 – 7.5 – 8.7) * ((123-35) mcg/L * 300 L * 365 days) * (~$15,500/0.188/ton)
= 100,000 / 12 * ~10g * ~$82,447/ton
= ~83,333g * ~$82,447/ton
= ~83kg * ~$83/kg
= ~$7,000

Note: This estimate only counted the cost of lithium carbonate
Intentional death rate, High Li and Mid Li: Table 1 (p. 108) of Schrauzer et al., op. cit.
Li levels of High Li and Mid Li counties: p. 107, ibid.
Water consumption per person-day: 300L, https://water.usgs.gov/edu/qa-home-percapita.html
Lithium carbonate price: $15.5k/ton, https://seekingalpha.com/article/4077382-lithium-miner-news-month-may-2017
Elemental lithium % in lithium carbonate: ~18.8%

Comment: Although $7,000 per homicide/suicide averted is not a bad cost-effectiveness. However, putting lithium in tap water might not be a good idea because lithium is very scarce resource, especially because lithium is essential to reduce greenhouse gas emission (electric batteries for electric car, etc.). World lithium reserve is estimated to be 13 million metric tons. I estimate we will need 600 million tons of lithium every year to provide 300L of tap water, lithiated with 88 ppb (88 mcg/L) additional lithium, each day for every person on the planet. That means, perhaps the more viable solution to provide lithium is lithiation of salt, flour or other food products. However, sea water contains 230 billion tons of lithium, at a concentration of 140 to 250 ppb (140 to 250 mcg/L), so it is not impossible to provide lithiated tap water for everyone, as it is possible to extract lithium from sea water.

Epigraph

Compare two lives—those of X and Y—and consider, for simplicity’s sake, only the amount of good and bad (and not also the distributional considerations). X’s life has (relatively) modest quantities of good and bad—perhaps fifteen kilo-units of positive value and five kilo-units of negative value. Y’s life, by contrast, has unbearable quantities of bad (say, fifty kilo-units of negative value). Y’s life also has much more good (seventy kilo-units of positive value) than does X’s. Nevertheless, X’s life might reasonably be judged less bad, even if Y’s has greater net value, judged in strictly quantitative terms—ten kilo-units versus twenty kilo-units of positive value.
-David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence (OUP, 2006): pp. 63-4

Introduction
David Benatar plausibly suggested that a life with 15k positives and 5k negatives “might reasonably be judged less bad” than a life with 70k positives and 50k negatives, as the former contains less suffering. However, can we say a life with 70k positives and 5.001k negatives worse than a life with 0 positives and 5k negatives? I will attempt to answer this question in this essay.

Deprivation-caused suffering

Consider, X, a life with 70k positives and 5.001k negatives, all 5.001k negatives consists of sufferings that are unrelated to the deprivation of pleasure.

Consider, Y, a life with 0 positives and 5k negatives, 3k negatives consists of sufferings that are unrelated to the deprivation of pleasure, and 2k negatives consist of sufferings that are caused by the deprivation of pleasure (frustration, boredom, etc.).

We can reasonably say that Life Y is better than Life X, as the suffering caused by the deprivation of pleasure is taken into account.

“Compensated suffering”, “net quality of life”

Concepts such as so-called “compensated suffering” or  “net quality of life” are the idea that pleasure can somehow make life net positive.

It is not implausible that pleasure can mitigate suffering during the course of one’s suffering. Consider, one suffers a “mild” headache for two hours. Also, one enjoys the pleasure of a good movie during the two hours of a “mild” headache. The pleasure of a good movie can mitigate the suffering of a headache, albeit not entirely. Consider an alternative scenario, one suffers two hours of the headache, but one enjoys the movie a week after (or before) the movie. It is plausible that the suffering of a headache was not mitigated by the pleasure of the movie.

Prospective and retrospective memory and “compensated suffering”

Prospective memory
X is incarcerated for life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. X spends 50 years behind the bars and dies.

Y is incarcerated for 1 years and spends 49 years out of prison and dies.

It is plausible that the incarceration of X is more than 50 times worse than the incarceration of Y. (if X is not adopted to the prison environment, thereby making suffering of imprisonment less bad)

This may be due to Y have hopes (prospective memory) of future life outside the prison, while X does not, rather than because Y’s suffering is compensated by the future life outside the prison.

If X and Y both have intelligence that limits the ability to foresee the future, nor remembers the past, X’s and Y’s incarceration will have same badness.

Retrospective memory

X is dying of cancer for 1 year, after having lived a life of 70 years of immense amounts of suffering.

Y is dying of cancer for 1 year, after having lived a life of 70 years of relatively little suffering and some fulfillments/happiness.

It is plausible that Y’s last 1 year of life is less bad than X’s last 1 year of life. That could be because Y, by retrospecting how well their life has gone so far, may think their life is “overally good”, which could make subjective experience of Y’s suffering less bad. (unless X is adopted to suffering, while Y is unaccustomed to suffering, thereby making X’s suffering less bad)

If X and Y both have lost the memory of past 70 years, X’s and Y’s cancer will have same badness.

Incomparability

How many times is NRS-11 10 pain bad compared to NRS-11 1 pain? 10 times? 2^10? 10^10?While some people may prefer NRS-11 10 pain

We may survey trade-off preferences of intensity-duration trade-off. For example, asking whether the respondent will accept converting NRS-11 10 1 second to NRS-11 1 1000 seconds. Although we can gather trade-off preferences of the average people from that data, we cannot say that data has metaphysical significance.

Inter-suffering, inter-suffering-intensity incomparability suggests pleasure-pain incomparability.

Thought experiment

Imagine that you have a life with 10k positives and 5k negatives, and so-called “net quality of life” will be 5k. However, would you accept a suggestion to convert your life to a life which contains 5k positives and 0 negatives? Most people, I assume, will say yes.

Moral offsetting and suffering-pleasure offsetting

Is it permissible for a person who saved 1 million people to kill 500 thousand people? Most of you will say, without a second thought, no. This analogy might well be applied to quality of life. If evil-doings cannot be offset by good-doings, it seems plausible that evil-experiences in life cannot be offset by good-experiences in life.

David Benatar’s new book The Human Predicament (OUP, 2017, THP henceforth) addresses various features of the human condition, which he calls “predicament“.

In Chapter 2. (Meaning) he suggests there are “(somewhat) good news”, that some of meaning(s) in life is not out of our reach. He suggests, in the chapter, that many people who made a significant impact on human history are “vile people”.

One way in which a life can have a “point” or be “significant” or “transcend limits” is by making an important mark. However, people can make marks in numerous ways, and many of those marks are moral stains. Indeed, among those who have made the biggest impacts in human history are vast numbers of vile people. Their mark is often death and destruction, as is the case with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and Pol Pot, for example. It is the brutal conquerors, tyrants, mass murderers, rapists, and pillagers who exert influence, create empires, and dominate societies.

Benatar, David. The Human Predicament: A Candid Guide to Life’s Biggest Questions (pp. 18-19). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.

(…)

The fact that wicked people make such an impact on human history is bound to cause unease among those who take meaning to be a positive feature of a life. One response is to acknowledge that wicked lives can be meaningful, but then say that we should seek only positive meaning. Another option is to say that a life is not meaningful unless its purposes or ways of transcending limits are positive, worthy, or valuable.

Ibid., p. 19

There are many cases which well-intentioned action do unintended (indirect) harm, often outweighing the intended/unintended benefit. Indirect, long-term, or possibly unintended, and possibly positive or possible negative consequences are called among effective altruist community as “flow-through effects”.

There are many possibly negative flow-through effects, I will list some of flow-through effects which I think negative. These examples are by no means exhaustive.

(1) Poor meat-eater problem: By helping the alleviation of the poverty of people in the poor countries (by donating to charities that help people in poor countries, for example), people (non-vegans) in those poor countries will increase the consumption of “meat” and other animal products. (See, e.g., “China quadrupled its meat consumption since 1971“)

(2) Saved meat-eater problem: By saving a non-vegan’s life (by donating to the Against Malaria Foundation, for example), one could possibly cause an additional death of thousands of non-human animals.

(3) Saved pro-natalist problem: By saving a pro-natalist’s life (by donating to the Against Malaria Foundation, for example), one could possibly cause an additional procreation of his or her children and subsequent generations of descendants. (“Assuming that each couple has three children, an original pair’s cumulative descendants over ten generations amount to 88,572 people”, Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, OUP, 2006, p. 6)

(4) Wild-animal suffering problem: By advocating anti-natalism, one may increase wild-animal suffering. (“I estimate that the typical human prevents on the order of ~1.4 * 10⁷ insect-years of suffering per year”, Brian Tomasik, “Strategic Considerations for Moral Antinatalists“, reducing-suffering.org, 2016)

(5) S-risks research information hazard problem: By researching about s-risks, and publishing it, one may spread informational hazards, thereby increasing, rather than decreasing, s-risks. (one such example is “Roko’s Basilisk“)

It is unclear from the text whether Professor Benatar thinks (1) any life that has an impact (whether positive or negative) can be meaningful (“terrestrially”, THP); (2) only lives that had only positive consequentialist impact can be meaningful (terrestrially); (3) a life can be meaningful (terrestrially) so long as s/he aimed to do good, even if the overall consequence of that person’s life was negative. I shall call the first, the second and the third views as (1) the impact view (of the terrestrial meaning); (2) the consequentialist view (of the terrestrial meaning); and (3) the intention view (of the terrestrial meaning), respectively.

Professor Benatar identified himself as a deontologist in his Ph.D. thesis in 1992. (“However, for those of us deontologists for whom personal responsiblity does not necessarily include responsibility for the actions of others which we fail to prevent, the distinction I have suggested is important.”, “A justification for rights“, UCT, 1992, p. 213)

Professor Benatar cites Alan Gewirth’s “the principle of intervening action” (Ibid., p. 212).

One can be a normative ethical deontologist and also be an existential logological consequentialist or one can be a normative ethical consequentialist and also be an existential logological intentionist.

For example, one can think there are actions that are never permissible even if intended to reduce suffering (such as the non-consensual killing of self-aware sentient beings), while thinking that his life will lack meaning if his life does not reduce, or even unintentionally increase the total amount of suffering there will be in the world. Such (normative ethical) deontologist is an (existential) logological negative consequentialist.

For example, one can be a (normative ethical) consequentialist, while thinking her life will have meaning if she aims to reduce the total amount of suffering in the world, even if she fails, and she does not reduce, or even unintentionally increase the total amount of suffering there will be in the world. Such (normative ethical) negative consequentialist is an (existential) logological intentionist.

My question is, what view(s) of existential logological views on terrestrial meaning is/are, if ever, correct? (1) the impact view (of the terrestrial meaning)? (2) the consequentialist view (of the terrestrial meaning)? (3) the intention view (of the terrestrial meaning)?

P.s. The second, short question: If one prevents 100% (or significant percent) of future possible suffering (possibly including the future possible suffering of inhabitants of other planets in distant galaxies), is that life still meaningless sub specie aeternitatis?

TL;DR: There may be intrinsic pronatalist bias in the very term ‘altruism’, narrowly construed.

Can preventing somebody (who will suffer) from coming into existence be a form of altruism? If you prevented a potential person from coming into existence, there is nobody to enjoy the benefit of nonexistence. This is called non-identity problem or existence requirement.

If you are giving a “gift” of a happy life to somebody, the recipient of the “gift” actually exists after you created that person. In cases of pro-natalistic “altruism”, there are beneficiaries who actually exists (after beneficence, in cases of prospective beneficence, beneficiaries will exist).

For this reason, donating to zoophilic zooantinatalistic animal charities (e.g. Vegan Outreach) cannot be called altruistic (the term altruism construed in a narrow sense, namely, existence requirement), because there are no animals thereby benefited. However, welfare improvement animal charities (e.g. “Humane Slaughter Association”) can be called “altruistic” because there are animals thereby “benefitted”.

Suffering prevention can take two forms. First, preventing particular causes of suffering, such as cancer (non-antinatalistic suffering prevention). Second, preventing sentient beings from coming into existence (antinatalistic suffering prevention). It is hard to call the second form of suffering prevention as “altruistic”, although still morally praiseworthy.

I think this nonidentity problem might be the reason behind why many EAs are pronatalist. If there is no sentient being in the world, there could be no beneficiary of altruism, although there is no one in need of altruism as well. However, if there are many sentient being in the world, there could be many beneficiaries of altruism.

So I think the usage of the term “altruism” could have intrinsic pronatalist bias in the questions of population ethics, due to nonidentity problem or existence requirement. Of course, “altruism” sometimes used in the broader sense, for example in the context of veganism or vegan advocacy.

Suffering-focused three-dimensional population ethics

1. Three dimensions of suffering

There are basically three dimensions of suffering. Intensity, Duration and People. The intensity of suffering, the duration of suffering each sentient being suffers, and the number of sentient being whcih suffers. I shall discuss in the case of trade-off, what kind of state of affairs should be chosen.

2. Cardinal and ordinal intensity of suffering

It is clear when one is in physical or emotional pain or not. Also, it is plausible that different kind of suffering can be compared in intensity. For example, it is possible for a lingual sentient being to compare, an electric shock which is administered on the same part and area of skin, with v voltage and i current, for t time with pressure pain administered with pressure p. This comparison is even applicable in psycholgical suffering. For example, one study compared suffering of boredom with electric shock. It is also possible to ordinarlise the different intensities of suffering. For example, it is plausible that some small differences of the intenstiy of noxious stimuli is so small that their differences are not perceptable to sentient neurological systems. It is plausible that their is minimal threshold in perception of pain in not just the smallest perceptable pain but at each increment of the pain intensity. This is not surprising given that our brain is a digital systems, which neurons either fire or not. It is plausible that different intensities of pain can be assigned different ordinal numbers. For example, an electric shock can be admnistered at incremental intensities. The first perceptable intensity is 1st least intense pain. Subsequently, while there will be an increment so small that are not perceptable, there will be a point which the increased intensity becomes perceptabel. That is the 2nd least intense pain. This process can continue until the expermentee can no longer feel an increase of pain. Let us say that typical humans can perceive 100 different degrees of pain. However, it is far from clear whether those ordinal numbers can linearly assigned a cardinal number for its disvalue. While some may think it is entirely reasonable that each ordinal number be converted to corresponding cardinal number, many will think the worst pain (100th least intenese) is more than 100 times as bad as the minimal perceptable pain (1st least intense). It is also possible to think the minimal perceptable pain is more than 0.01 times as bad as the worse pain. This preferences can be ascertained by empirical experiment. Under the plausible assumption that the same intensity of pain of longer time is linearly more bad than the same intensity of pain of a shorter time (that is, i intensity of pain inflicted for x time is x/y times as bad as i intensity of pain inflicted for y time), the experimentee can be asked to choose between 100 seconds of 1st least intense pain and 1 second of 100th least intense pain. If the experimentee chooses the former, the duration of pain can be increased for the former. (or the time ratio can be adjusted) For example, now the experimentee is asked to choose between 101 seconds of 1st least intense pain and 1 second of 100th least intense pain. If the experimentee chooses the later, the duration of pain of the later can be increased. For example, now the experimentee is asked to choose between 100 seconds of the 1st least intense pain and 1.01 seconds of the 100th least intense pain. The trade-off ratio is roughly the point which the experimentee ceases to prefer one option, and be indifferent to which kinds of pain to be administered. Another approach of cardinalisation of the pain intensities is to use the cardinal number of external noxius stumuli to respective ordinal numbers of the pain intensity. For example, volatage, current or power in case of electric shcok, scoville index in case of chemical pain, moving energy (speed^2*mass) in case of projectile, pressure in case of pressure. It may also be possible to objectively measure pain by EEG, fMRI or the like.

3. Parfit’s Two hells

Derek Parfit suggested that the world in which there be 10 people each suffer for 50 years is worse than 10 millon people each suffer of same intensity for 50 years minus a day.

In Hell One, the last generation consists of ten innocent people, who each suffer great agony for fifty years. The lives of these people are much worse than nothing. They would all kill themselves if they could. In Hell Two, the last generation consists not of ten but of ten million innocent people, who each suffer agony just as great for fifty years minus a day.

If we assume that we shall certainly exist in one of these two Hells, it would clearly be rational, in self‐interested terms, to prefer Hell Two, since we should then suffer for one day less. Should we conclude that Hell Two would be better, in the sense that has moral relevance? Would Satan be acting less badly if this is the Hell that he brought about?

The answers are both No. Hell Two is in one respect better. The amount of agony per person would be very slightly less; it would be reduced by less than 0.01 per cent. But this fact is morally outweighed by the vast increase in the number of people who are in agony, enduring lives that are much worse than nothing. In HellTwo the amount of suffering is almost a million times greater.

-Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (OUP. 1986), p. 393

4. Duration-people population ethics

According to Parfit, the world with which 10 million people suffering for 50year-1day is clearly worse than the world with which 10 people suffering 50 years. However, the hell B is distributinally better. Distributionally, the world in which 10 people suffering for 50 years is worse than 10 million people suffering for 50year-1day. If there are 10 million potential people in both worlds, the world A has gini coefficient of nearly 1 (0.999999), while the world B has gini coefficient of 0. For this distributional considerations, some people will choose the world which person-time is longe in less dramatic cases than Parfit’s. For example, let us consider two worlds, hell C contains 10 people suffering for 50 years, hell D contains 1000 people suffering with same intensity for 1 year. On negative utilitarian view, hell C is better, as there are 500 suffering years, while hell D has 1000 suffering years. However, many will consider hell D to be better. If there are 1000 potential people in both hells, hell C has geni coefficient of 0.99 while hell D has geni coefficient of 0.

5. Intensity-Duration population ethics

Let us consider the hell E, which contains 10 people suffering 50th least intense suffering for 1 year, and the hell F, which contains 10 people suffering 1st least intense suffering for 50 years. Which world is better place? One way to answer that question is negative utilitarianism. We can assign different cardinal numbers for 1th least intense and 50th least intense suffering, and assign respective disvalues to two hells. Thresholdism, threshold lexicalism and lexicalism disagree.

6. Thresholdism

It is in accordance with many people’s intuition that some suffering is ‘bearable’. The classical thresholdism says we should not care about so-called mild suffeirng. Examplees of so-called mild sufferings may include, so-called mild headache, menstrual pain, fatiuge, bladder and bowel distension. However, it is implausible that so-called mild sufferings do not matter at all. Mild suffering is bad because its absence is better than its presence. Clearly it is better to have a life even devoid of the mildest sufferings. Also, thresholism is implausible in another way. While it is entirely plausible that a noxious stimuli is bad if and only if when a noxious stimuli is above theshold of perception, it seems highly arbitrary that a noxious stimuli begins to be bad on certain above perception thereshold point.

7. Threshold lexicalism

Threshold lexicalism says while sub-threshold pains are bad, in the presence of above-threshold pains, the above-thereshold pain should be prioritized at all costs. However, threshold lexicalism just a little less implausible than classical thresholdism. Why a pain just above certain threshold should be considered infinitely bad compared to a pain just below certain threshold?

8. Lexicalism (minimax)

Lexicalism says that a pain of any higher intensity is lexically more bad than a pain of lower intensity. In other words, lexicalism implies ‘minimax’ principle, a suffering-focused version of John Rawls’ maximin principle. On maximin view, he world which the most intensely suffering person is suffering the least intensely is the best. However, there is still some implausibilities in maximin view. The hell G with which 10 people are suffering 100th least intense pain for 50 years can be plausibly judged as better than the hell H which 10 million people are sufferng 99th least intense pain for 50 years.

9. Tomasik’s pinpricks

Brian Tomasik suggested continuity argument for the moral considerability of so-called mild suffering.

Some people have an intuition that small pains like a pinprick don’t add up to outweigh big pains like torture. I sympathize with this sentiment, though I’m not sure of my final stance on the matter. There’s a counterargument based on “continuity,” which says that one prick with a 3 mm pin is less bad than thousands of pricks with a 2 mm pin, and one prick with a 4 mm pin is less bad than thousands with a 3 mm pin, and so on. Eventually it seems like one stab with a sword should be less bad than some insanely big number of pinpricks. I’m personally not sure suffering is continuous like this or whether I would declare some threshold below which suffering doesn’t matter.

-Brian Tomasik

10. Line of indifference

A line which we should be indifferent which potential world becomes actual could be drawn in two-dimensional graph.

11. Intensity-duration

Negative utilitarian line of indifference is reversely proportional to curve. That is, NU-LoIs are i=x/d. Duration prioritarianism and intensity prioritarianism will have less convexly shaped LoIs from the origin.

12. Intensity-People

NU LoI is a reversely proportional curve. That is, NU-LoIs are i=x/p. Intensity prioritarianism and people prioritarianism will have less convexly shaped LoIs from origin.

13. Intensity-Duration*People

On the plausible view that sufferings matter equally regardless of distributional considerations, we can draw a graph of intensity-duration*person. NU-LoI will be i=x/(d*p).

14. Plane of indifference and intensity-duration-people graph

We can draw a three dimensional graph of intensity-duration-people. Plane of indifference of NU will be x=idp (i.e., i=x/(d*p)).

Blockchain technology might make it easier for AIs to hire humans. AI of sufficient sophistication will pass the Turing test, in forms of email correspondences and instant messaging first and then a Turing test in a form of voice call, then a Turing test in a form of video call, ultimately perhaps in a form of face-to-face interaction.

We can hire people online, not least by sites such as freelancer.com or ethlance.com. There is no reason why AIs could not hire humans or make money by working online. Although it is possible for AIs to earn money by working for humans or hire humans for money by fiat currencies alone, the anonymity, the global and decentralised nature of many, if not most, cryptocurrency makes it even more difficult for humans control AI’s money-making and spending activities. First, some humans will not even care whether the boss they are working for is actually not a human. For them, making money is more than enough. Possible existential risk is not of their concern. Second, AI of sufficient sophistication will be able to pretend (i.e. pass the Turing test) in all forms of telecommunciations including, but not limited to, in the forms of email/instant message correspondences, voice call and video call.

Before long, there could be an AI-run corporation which is run on blockchain (perhaps a decentralised autonomous organisation), which hires AIs and humans with a general purpose cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin or Ripple) or an its own cryptocurrency (!), and collaborating and outsourcing to other AI- or human-run corporations. Decision making could be done by majority (larger than 50%) stake vote of AI or human coinholders. That AI-run corporation could be in whatever industry. It could operate a call centre outsourcing company, telepsychiatry company, law firm, search engine company, advertisement company, management consulting company, AI-resource company (a company which provides AIs to an entity which hires AI for money), etc.

It might not take a long time for us to see a blockchain-based de facto soverign state, which (the) decision making(s) is/are partly or entirely done by an AI or AIs. Any physical element of the governance of the sovereign state (i.e. policing and defence) can be done by hiring humans for money. Cryptocurrency is not 100% extortion-proof in some sense. While the custody of the cryptocurrency can be maintained with only knowledge of the wallet address and the private key, it is difficult for many, if not most, people to memorise them so they do not need a paper to store it. We are quite ‘wet’ robots. Even if we memorise the wallet address and the private key, we can be threatened to give up the wallet address and the private key, or even tortured or administered a medication or even perhaps lobotomised to give up the wallet address and the private key. To my knowledge, AI is relatively quite free of those vulnerabilities.